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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
GIS-INTEGRATED MATHEMATICAL MODELING OF SOCIAL PHENOMENA AT
MACRO- AND MICRO- LEVELS—A MULTIVARIATE GEOGRAPHICALLY-WEIGHTED
REGRESSION MODEL FOR IDENTIFYING LOCATIONS VULNERABLE TO HOSTING
TERRORIST SAFE-HOUSES: FRANCE AS CASE STUDY
by
Elyktra Claire Eisman
Florida International University, 2015
Miami, Florida
Professor Thomas A. Breslin, Major Professor
Adaptability and invisibility are hallmarks of modern terrorism, and keeping pace with its
dynamic nature presents a serious challenge for societies throughout the world.
Innovations in computer science have incorporated applied mathematics to develop a
wide array of predictive models to support the variety of approaches to counterterrorism.
Predictive models are usually designed to forecast the location of attacks. Although this
may protect individual structures or locations, it does not reduce the threat—it merely
changes the target. While predictive models dedicated to events or social relationships
receive much attention where the mathematical and social science communities
intersect, models dedicated to terrorist locations such as safe-houses (rather than their
targets or training sites) are rare and possibly nonexistent. At the time of this research,
there were no publically available models designed to predict locations where violent
extremists are likely to reside. This research uses France as a case study to present a
complex systems model that incorporates multiple quantitative, qualitative and
geospatial variables that differ in terms of scale, weight, and type.

Though many of

these variables are recognized by specialists in security studies, there remains
controversy with respect to their relative importance, degree of interaction, and
v

interdependence. Additionally, some of the variables proposed in this research are not
generally recognized as drivers, yet they warrant examination based on their potential
role within a complex system. This research tested multiple regression models and
determined that geographically-weighted regression analysis produced the most
accurate result to accommodate non-stationary coefficient behavior, demonstrating that
geographic variables are critical to understanding and predicting the phenomenon of
terrorism. This dissertation presents a flexible prototypical model that can be refined and
applied to other regions to inform stakeholders such as policy-makers and law
enforcement in their efforts to improve national security and enhance quality-of-life.
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I.

Introduction

Adaptability and invisibility are hallmarks of modern terrorism, and keeping pace with its
dynamic nature presents a serious challenge for societies throughout the world. The
rising profile of terrorism has resulted in an acute awareness of both its reach and its
destructive capabilities. Enormous resource expenditures are allocated to its eradication,
yet the agility with which it responds to countermeasures has endowed it with a lasting
resilience. This frontless conflict has required of its targets a level of vigilance exceeding
that which many of them have ever experienced. Conventional combat techniques have
fallen short of providing a level of security acceptable to the populations they are
intended to protect. To that end, both the private and public sectors have experimented
with creative technological applications in an effort to understand this enemy with the
intention of anticipating its behavior.

Innovations in computer science have incorporated applied mathematics to develop a
wide array of models that reflect the variety of approaches to counterterrorism. Many of
these are analytical, as it is hoped that added insight will bring more effective solutions,
and this is certainly true. Others are predictive. While both types value substantive
understanding, predictive models lend their focus to prevention.

Predictive models are generally designed to forecast the location of attacks. Successful
prediction is assessed by the model’s ability to reveal vulnerable locations so that
appropriate defensive measures can be implemented. Although this may protect
individual structures or locations, it does not reduce the threat—it merely changes the
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target. This reality has not been lost on the security community. Therefore, resources
and efforts have been directed at identifying the origin of the threat.

Such models

frequently employ agent-based modeling and social network analysis, as they focus on
the inter-personal relationships that constitute terrorist networks.

The value of their

contribution is evident from their continued use and from the resources currently devoted
to further training and research. While predictive models dedicated to events or social
relationships receive much attention where the mathematical and social science
communities intersect, models dedicated to terrorist locations such as safe-houses
(rather than their targets or training sites) are rare and possibly nonexistent. At the time
of this research, there are no publically available models designed to predict locations
where violent extremists are likely to reside.

This question requires a complex systems model to incorporate the variety of
quantitative, qualitative and geospatial variables that might impact the model. The
selection of a safe-house location is dependent on many variables that differ in terms of
scale, weight, and type. Though many of these variables are recognized by specialists
in security studies, there remains controversy with respect to their relative importance,
degree of interaction, and interdependence. Additionally, some of the variables proposed
in this research are not generally recognized as drivers, yet they warrant examination
based on their potential role within a complex system.

These variables act as constraints and drivers that influence an individual’s decisionmaking process in determining the most viable and safest place to live. Geography is a
multi-dimensional variable set that must be included to answer the question. The choice
of where to situate oneself has objective and subjective components. The subjective
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aspects of decision-making, such as feelings and perceptions about environmental
suitability, often have a basis in objectivity. Enclaves comprising a single ethnic or
national majority often exist because events encouraged group migrations from one
geographic region to another. There was either a driver at the point of origin, a driver to
encourage migration to the destination, or a combination of both. The drivers affecting
these migrations affect the contemporary social atmosphere within the immigrant
communities and the attitudes of citizens of the host country. The location of these
enclaves within the spatial context of the host country and the accessibility to and from
the country of origin, can play a significant role in how other variables impact the model.
For example, an individual might choose to live in an enclave of his home culture
because a life among natives of the host nation would expose him to unfriendly attitudes
and treatment. Residence within this enclave could restrict access to some resources,
just as it could increase access to other resources open only to those in a circle of trust.
Residence in the enclave might increase or decrease mobility, depending on where and
in what context the individual wanted to travel. Mobility is increased if there is benefit to
blending in with a crowd, but can be challenging if one must travel outside the enclave or
cover a large distance. Thus, the size and shape of these enclaves and the geographic
resources (such as infrastructure) available to them can affect the model. This reality is
understood by social scientists, especially geographers, historians, and political
scientists. Doreen Massey (2005) characterizes space as being "…about relations,
fractures, discontinuities, practices of engagement…" as an "…intrinsic relationality of
the spatial…" (Massey, 85). Geography encompasses a set of variables that must be
incorporated. Brunsdon et al (1998) presented geographically weighted regression to
address the problem of multivariate non-stationarity in geographic space.
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For the regression function
𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 = � 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗 + 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖
Brunsdon et al estimate (β j p j ) for each variable j and each location i with localized
coefficients. They suggest potential localization functions, among them the Gaussian
distance-decay-based weighting function

𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑒𝑒 −𝑑𝑑
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𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 /2ℎ
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bounding each regression estimate. Here, d ik is the distance between observations i
and k. The constant h is a constraint on d ik —the kernel bandwidth—and is described in
detail in the chapters “Model Development and Design” and “Exploratory Regression
Analysis Candidate Variables” .

GIS platforms can accommodate the plethora of variable types that must be
incorporated to conduct this novel approach to identifying where violent extremists might
call “home”. GIS platforms can process multiple factors that cannot be adequately
modeled with linear analytic technique. Additionally, GIS software environments can
present multidimensional models visually in a way that can more easily be understood
than by more traditional, textual methods. Additionally, the variables and datasets can be
updated and rectified to refine the model, resulting in greater sophistication of analysis.
GIS software also has the ability to retain a history of model updates so a user may keep
a record of variable changes and model adaptations.
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This is essential for future

researchers to be able to see the evolution of this model and adapt it for their own uses
as well as validate it in future studies.

Most importantly, this dissertation research shows that geography is critical to
understanding and predicting the phenomenon of terrorism. Clare Richardson (2011)
conducted a multivariate regression analysis examining the power of relative deprivation
theory to explain radicalization. Her global study examined 56 countries between 1980
and 2008 to assess the correlation of unemployment and tertiary education levels with
terrorist attacks. Since her research analyzes data at the country level, the analysis
conceptualizes a country as a community. However, in examining potential drivers of
radicalization, this approach limits the depth to which one can study the phenomenon.
The country-as-community approach emphasizes shared identity on a macro-level, and
assumes that there is indeed a country-level shared identity. The problem of
radicalization might stem in part from individuals or small groups not identifying with the
host country. In this context, a country-level analysis would overlook that phenomenon.

Central Research Question

This dissertation endeavors to determine the factors that promote an environment that
drives and sustains radicalization. Certain assumptions have been made with respect to
the nature and identity of these contributing factors in order to focus the research and
make it viable. The first assumption is that the most influential factors are social and/or
geographical. The second assumption is that the selected factors have the most
significant impact in answering the following central research question—
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"What factors influence or determine the probability that a region will host a base of
operation—or safe-house—for terrorist activities, and if so, why do these factors play
significant roles?”

The dependent variable was narrowly constrained to facilitate testing against the set of
independent variables. Thus, the dependent variable—the existence of an arrest/raid
location—was limited to those raids and arrests that were associated with Islamic
extremist ideologies. Broadening the scope to include other extremist ideologies such as
militant Basque separatism, would require the inclusion of additional variables and
datasets. Some of the variables and datasets might not be relevant to datapoints
associated with Islamic extremism. For example, variables that would exacerbate or
inhibit Basque extremism might not have any effect on Islamic extremism, as different
social groups and value systems are in play.

II.

Methodology

Overview

The regression analysis tested multiple variables with and without geographic weighting
to determine the existence and importance of geographic factors to the design of a
viable model.
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This research determined that geographically-weighted regression analysis produced
the most accurate model among the regression models tested for this research.
Geographically Weighted Regression (GWR) generates a multivariate predictive model
that functions in a geospatial information systems (GIS) environment. This model was
developed and tested in ESRI’s ArcGIS 10.2.

Whereas other types of multivariate regression analysis assume that variables—or
regression coefficients—behave uniformly throughout the model, geographically
weighted regression (GWR) accommodates non-stationary coefficient behavior. For
instance, independent variables might affect the dependent variable in different ways
depending on the geographic space, with the coefficient varying locally, rather than
having one effect that permeates the model space. For the model in this research, GWR
analyzes the coefficient behavior around event locations and outputs coefficient values
around these “fit points”.

Sample Data

In this research, the test data are event locations and residences where an arrest or raid
occurred and where weapons, bomb-making materials, and extremist literature were
discovered by law enforcement. Test data—hereafter referred to as events or event
data—were obtained from newspaper reports and online databases from 2008 through
2012. Unfortunately, these sources do not always provide sufficient geographic detail on
every event. For instance, an arrest or raid was described as having occurred in Paris,
but no other information, such as arrondissement or street address, was provided. This
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lack of granularity limits the model’s accuracy because there is no localized datapoint
around which to test the coefficient behavior. Granularity inconsistencies also caused a
clustering effect that artificially increased the dependent variable count in cities that
contained multiple event occurrences. These event clusters could not be accurately
distributed because the report did not specify where in the city the event occurred.
Methodologically, there are different approaches to this problem. Among the simplest
and most direct is to eliminate those events from the dataset or distribute the datapoints
throughout the city, based on one or more criteria, such as population or even
distribution throughout the city’s arrondissements. Since there are only 50 datapoints
that fit the criteria to qualify as events, or test data, omission was a last resort given that
regression techniques, especially those incorporating geospatial attributes, generally
speaking, function best with as large a sample size as possible. (Knofczynski &
Mundfrom, 2008) (Chang) 1 Distribution of datapoints according to population density
was also considered. This method was rejected because its inclusion implies that an
independent variable—population density—is a regression coefficient before the model
has been generated. Therefore, the clustered events were distributed throughout the city
as evenly as possible with respect to arrondissements around the city centroid, not
adjusting to any other variable that might artificially incorporate it as a coefficient value.

1Knofczynski

and Mundrom (2008) conducted Monte Carlo simulations to determine minimum sample sizes
for different numbers of independent variables and correlation levels. Their analysis indicates a sample size
of 21 can produce “good” estimation for an R2value of .7. The GWR in this research yields an R2 of .71.
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Methodology—GIS Platform

The analysis uses geographically-weighted regression to examine multiple factors that
might correlate with locations where raids and arrests have revealed extremist literature,
weapons, or bomb-making materials, or where individuals suspected of planning or
participating in terrorism-related activities have resided. ESRI software was selected
based on its extensive library of geostatistical tools and its ability to incorporate large
datasets, process them and display the results cartographically. The software is also
widely available, so the resulting prototype model can be tested and refined by those
interested in adapting the model to a different case.

Data for Coefficient Computation—Challenges of incorporating data from multiple
sources and in multiple formats

Despite ArcGIS flexibility, model implementation was not a matter of plug-and-play.
Datasets were imported in tabular form, but often shape files (a native file format of
ArcGIS) had to be built in order to conduct geostatistical analyses and display the data
properly. Creating shapefiles is time consuming, labor intensive, and requires a high
level of attention to detail when generating georeferenced points for analysis.

Datasets were obtained from INSEE, Eurostat, Data.Gouv.Fr, GADM.org, Pew
Research, Diva-GIS, and ESRI. Data granularity, unique location identifiers, and file
formats differed and often had to be manually edited before they were integrated in the
GIS environment for processing. In addition to manual editing of individual files, one of
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the most important factors was table and data integration which allowed data from
different sources to be combined and analyzed as an entire data set. The section below
details these challenges and the techniques used to surmount them.

The first obstacle was one of semantics. Definitions of communes and arrondissements
were often mislabeled, and some sources referred to arrondissements as communes
and vice versa. Official terminology is often problematic for performing relational joins. A
join is a unique identifier that allows records from two or more tables to be joined
together so the entire linked contents can be queried. For instance, a shapefile listed
350 arrondissements, yet there are officially only 342.

The discrepancy might be due in part to the term “arrondissement” being used to refer to
two types of administrative divisions. Departmental arrondissements refer to the 342
subdivisions of France’s 342 departments. However, Lyon, Marseille, and Paris are
departmental arrondissements that contain municipal arrondissements. 2 Cantons are a
finer level of granularity than departmental arrondissements but are not always strict
subdivisions of arrondissements. Cantons contain multiple communes but the
boundaries do not always coincide with commune boundaries, as they can straddle
communes. INSEE does not list the number of cantons, but its datasets list 3,785
“canton-ou-ville”—canton or city. Other sources list 3,883 cantons or 4,055 cantons 34.

2

http://self.gutenberg.org/articles/Arrondissements_of_France#References

3

Gael L’Hermine. Local Government in France. World Elections
Blog.https://welections.wordpress.com/links/guide-to-the-2014-french-elections/. List 4,055
cantons.
4
http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2011/apr/20/southern-france-sarkozy-shale-gas. Lists
3,883 cantons.
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INSEE defines the commune as the smallest municipal division and lists 36,682. GISDiva hosted Database of Global Administrative Areas (GADM) shapefiles consisting of
350 arrondissements. Since the shapefile projected accurately, I used the 350
arrondissements as a guide for obtaining and joining the other datasets.

As a result of these variations in territorial definitions, the independent variable that
quantified ethnic representation on the municipal level presented one of the most
significant data processing challenges in this research. A dataset that could enable
quantification of how well-represented those of North African and Middle Eastern
heritage were within their communities could shed light on the impact of having a
political voice. I could find no published datasets that quantified this type of
representation, largely because France does not gather data on the ethnicity of its
political candidates. Data.gouv.fr retains municipal election data, but the downloadable
datasets contained voting statistics only—not candidate and winner names. The site
does not offer the ability to download datasets that list the names of those elected. To
get the data that displays the candidate names, I drilled down to the commune level
within each department separately via a multi-step process.

First, I navigated to the page corresponding to a specific department on the website. The
department page displays a directory of several pages, each page containing groups of
communes in that department. After choosing a page for a group of communes, I
selected a link to a commune, to display the data with the winning candidates and the
number of votes. There is a download link on each page, but the downloaded data does
not contain candidate names. Since there is no way to download the displayed data, I
manually copied and pasted directly from the webpage to an excel sheet to save the
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data in tabular format. Once on the spreadsheet, I calculated the total number of
municipal level representatives by summing several blocks of entries separately
because fields are merged. Then, I scrutinized the representatives’ first and last names
to identify those that were likely Middle Eastern or North African in origin. The
percentage ethnic municipal level representation is the ratio of the names I assessed as
ethnic to the total number of representatives on each municipal council. This process
had to be followed 350 times, resulting in 350 spreadsheets divided among 5 excel files.

I faced similar challenges when gathering statistics on departmental ethnicities. INSEE’s
data was buried under multiple menu layers. Most of the INSEE datasets only
differentiated on the basis of immigrant or non-immigrant, or French or non-French
citizen. To discover specific nationalities of immigrants, I located datasets on the
regional level and downloaded each individually. Each dataset had to be renamed
because all the regions saved their datasets as the same filename. To obtain
departmental statistics, I computed percentages from the raw numbers for each
department within each region’s file. The percentages for each nationality in 101
departments were compiled in a separate table with geographic coordinates of
department centroids. Finally, the data could be imported to the GIS software for
analysis.

12

France as Test Case

The enormous datasets common to GIS applications require that this research be limited
to a single country case study. France has been selected as the case study primarily for
the availability of its social and GIS data. It also contains multiple ethnic communities
that have historically presented a security threat, shares borders with several states, and
has major sea ports. France has the highest Muslim population percentage in Europe
(approximately 7.5%) and tension exists between this population and the host state.
Thus, the safe-houses of interest are often those of extremist Islamic actors. 56

France has a government whose president and senate are elected via its electoral
college, enabling its citizens to effect change through the ballot box. Yet, it faces the
unwelcome challenge of domestic terrorism.

The profiles of these hostile actors

complicate analyses, as not all are first-generation immigrants from cultures with a
history of religious fundamentalism. Although France offers its citizens free education
for those aged 2-16 and a universal healthcare system (Dutton, 2007), many of the
hostile actors that threaten France’s national security are native-born citizens who were
converted and radicalized by Muslim extremists. This reality discredits theories that
postulate that repressive governments, lack of educational opportunities, and basic

5

Population data estimated for 2010. According to Pew Research Center, there were
approximately 4.7 million Muslims in France. Germany has the highest Muslim population in
Europe—approximately 4.8 million—but that population comprised approximately 5.8% of its
population. http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015/01/15/5-facts-about-the-muslimpopulation-in-europe/.
6

2010 Pew Report--"Muslim Population by Country". The Future of the Global Muslim Population.
Pew Research Center.http://www.pewforum.org/2011/01/27/table-muslim-population-by-country/.
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services such as healthcare are the drivers of radicalization. The dynamic is not so
easily explained.

France’s foreign policy is not hostile to states with large Muslim populations. France did
not join U.S. forces in the invasion of Iraq—a military action that was unpopular with
Middle Eastern states. It supported a multilateral peace agreement concerning Israel
and is in favor of the establishment of a Palestinian state (State Department Bureau of
European and Eurasian Affairs, 2008).

Therefore, significant factors must be present to account for the severity of France’s
security problem.

“… France has never fully accepted North African immigrants, and the
second generation perhaps even less than the first. That they speak
French fluently and readily absorb French culture does not make them
welcome in France as earlier waves of immigrants had been…Most North
Africans feel they are trapped in a hopeless downward spiral of
joblessness, racial discrimination, and clashes with police.” (Tlemçani,
1997)

Although France is officially a secular state, religion plays a significant cultural role.
France is historically Catholic, 7 and the introduction of a relatively recent but significant
Muslim population alters its cultural composition. The secular government has actively

7
Catholicism was the state religion until 1787, excluding the period between 1592-1685 during
which the Edict of Nantes endowed Protestants with limited rights.
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and officially supported and promoted its Muslim immigrant communities economically,
politically, and culturally. For example, Muslims in military service have access to Muslim
clergy and meals consistent with Islamic law. Commercial establishments provide time
off and special facilities for Islamic prayer. (Viorst, 1996)

Despite its efforts, France continues to face challenges integrating its immigrant
populations, regardless of their ethnicity.

The most significant barrier is difficult to

pinpoint, but it is likely a combination of factors. Ethnic, religious, and economic drivers
are the most frequently cited obstacles for North Africans and Middle Eastern
populations.

Doug Ireland (2005), a journalist reporting on politics and culture who spent ten years in
France, blames a “…deep-seated, searing, soul-destroying racism that the unemployed
and profoundly alienated young of the ghettos face every day of their lives, both from the
police, and when trying to find a job or decent housing.”

Patrick Simon, et al (2010) encountered racial prejudice in his research on French
identity. He refers to France as an assimilationist country because it requires that
immigrants identify exclusively as French, explaining that its government and citizens
view a hyphenated ethnic identity as incomplete assimilation and thus not genuinely
“French”. Simon’s research analyzes data from the 2008-2009 survey, Trajectories and
Origins: Survey on Population Diversity in France (TeO). The Institut National d’Études
Démographiques (INED), the Institut National de la Statistique et des Etudes
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Économiques (INSEE), and Patrick Simon conducted the research. The survey queried
22,000 residents of mainland France—the largest survey ever conducted that comprised
first- and second-generation immigrants as well as non-immigrant French (native-born
for two generations). It examined French identity and social cohesion, asking
respondents who they consider French, whether or to what degree they perceive
themselves as French, and what impacts these perceptions. Respondents were also
asked how others perceived their identity, and how their perceptions of others’ views
affected their self-identification as French. Simon detected a visual component affecting
whether or not an individual is accepted as truly French, and that those from
predominantly Muslim countries are most negatively affected by that prejudice. Simon
observed that “The feeling of having one’s Frenchness denied clearly follows a ‘line of
visibility’ affecting primarily immigrants from sub-Saharan Africa and their descendants,
then immigrants and descendants from North Africa, Turkey, and Southeast Asia. The
pattern is completely different for immigrants from Europe, who feel accepted in the
national community.” He adds that people are assessed on whether or not they “look
French”. (Simon, 2012) The unspoken requirement to physically appear western
European places inescapable restrictions on those who do not conform to that “look”,
and the lack of control over how completely one can integrate or assimilate will inevitably
breed frustration. The intensity of that frustration is exacerbated or mitigated by many
factors both external and internal to the individual, but the ethnic component affecting
acceptance as French might play a role in how susceptible one is to extreme ideologies
associated with the identity to which that individual is tied.

Adida, et al (2009) differentiated ethnic from religious components by surveying two
groups—one Muslim and one Christian—of second- and third-generation Senegalese
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immigrants. Both groups are ethno-linguistically equivalent. Adida, Laitin, and Valfort
measured the groups’ assimilation into French society, defining assimilation as, “…(i)
their attachment to their culture of origin; and (ii) their identiﬁcation with the host culture
and society.” (Adida et al, 2012) While both groups experienced integration obstacles,
the Muslim Senegalese immigrants in the sample were significantly less-integrated than
the Christians in the sample. Adida et al’s findings are based on 2009 field experiments
they conducted on these groups. The experiments consisted of behavioral games
designed to measure trust and altruism. Their results showed that native French
participants (individuals outside the sample sets whose grandparents are French-born)
tend to more often discriminate against the Muslim set because they are more likely to
have recognizably Muslim first names. The Muslims in the sample set are more likely to
perceive systemic discrimination from French institutions and as a result, choose not to
participate in them.

Milton Viorst (1996) argues the barriers have economic roots, but his explanation implies
an ethnic component as well, since mostly Northern African ethnic groups responded to
the economic driver that generated the integration barrier. Many of France’s Muslim
youth are descendants of immigrants from France’s former colonies. The older
generation immigrated to France just after World War II to fill a labor demand to rebuild
the city, compensating for the post-war shortage of working-age French males. Many of
the immigrants settled permanently, but the labor demand and economic growth did not
continue into the coming generations. High unemployment can reduce the motivation to
pursue an education if a degree is unlikely to result in a profitable career. The resulting
poverty breeds crime, frustration, and fodder for extremists recruiting new adherents.
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Religious, ethnic, and economic forces and other conflict points foster an environment
that can impede, if not prevent, the integration of Muslim immigrants into French society.
Therefore, these individuals may be unlikely to see themselves as Frenchmen even after
they obtain citizenship. Their primary identity often rests with either their country of
origin or with their religion. Furthermore, perceptions of rejection by the host country
(France) and its citizens, combined with a sense of deprivation of opportunities enjoyed
by its natives, provide a breeding ground of resentment and hostility that could render
them vulnerable to radicalization or to tolerating an environment where extremists can
operate.

However, one cannot assume that unwillingness to self-identify as French is the root
factor contributing to the development of terrorist safehavens, and that its impact
overrides that of an economically vibrant and open society. Terrorists do not establish
bases uniformly throughout the country. Nor do they establish them randomly in Muslim
enclaves.

Closer examination indicates the presence of multiple contributing factors of varying
weights, and these are found in other countries, as well.

These factors and their

relationships are highly complex, and assume different degrees of importance
depending on the country context in which they are considered.
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III.

Related Research

A body of research has applied quantitative techniques to parse through an array of
potential drivers related to some aspect of radicalized behavior, be it criminally or
ideologically motivated.

Some of these efforts have incorporated geospatial

components. Others have focused on cultural or economic drivers. The research
presented in this dissertation considers social, political, geospatial, and economic
factors. Further, previous research has focused on attacks, pre-attack activities, and
training sites. This dissertation research seeks insights into identifying where terrorists
might establish their residences. Others have conducted research incorporating
geospatial and temporal analytic techniques. The regression model presented in this
research does not include temporal analysis due to limitations in the sample set.,
Suggestions on how temporal analysis might be included in future efforts are included in
the text for cases in which an appropriate sample set is available.

Smith et al. (2006) incorporated multiple social and geographic factors with a temporal
component to discover timing and distance patterns in preparatory and attack activities
associated with terrorism.

Smith et al. used datasets provided by law enforcement

entities and thus had highly granular data with which to develop and test their research.
This data 8 consisted of 38 data points spanning a 25-year period, each data point
consisting of addresses of terrorists’ residences, preparation areas, and attack locations

8

Some data points did not have sufficient temporal data, so they were not included in the 38
sample points for the aspect of the research that incorporated temporal analysis.
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in the United States. 9 The temporal component of the analysis consisted of dividing the
geo-located data into four chronological stages designated by type of activity, from
recruitment and preparation to the culminating act, such as a bombing. In reviewing this
research, the reader should keep in mind that the study data was limited to the United
States, and thus the conclusions of Smith et al. might not apply to terrorist behavior in
other countries.

Temporal analysis revealed that the average time period between recruitment and
culminating act is relatively short—approximately three months, and that the geospatial
pattern is well-defined for international, left-wing, and single-issue (such as animal
rights) terrorists. The geospatial pattern is bi-modal, in that nearly half the attacks
occurred within 30 miles of the terrorist’s residence, but over a third of the attacks were
at least 271 miles away. 10

Though the research of Smith et al was geospatially based and incorporated variables
such as crime—it included both criminal and non-criminal preparatory behavior—social
support systems, its focus was behavioral, and thus did not include the variety of
environmental variables that could impact the behaviors and the pace with which those
behaviors would unfold. However, they speculated on potential drivers behind the
localized spatial pattern associated with international terrorists and in doing so,
highlighted variables that could impact extremist behavior. Smith et al suggested that
international terrorists’ residential locations were restricted by “…new immigration status,
lack of transportation, lack of knowledge of the urban landscape, an attempt to minimize

9

The types of terrorism included environmental, single-issue, right-wing, left-wing, and
international terrorism.
10
Right wing terrorists did not conform to this unusual pattern.
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attention or a variety of other reasons.” (Smith, Damphousse, & Roberts, 2006) Variables
such as immigration status, unfamiliarity with the urban landscape, and concern about
not blending in, allude to several of the variables tested in the regression analyses
presented in this dissertation.

Research involving the intersection of terrorism studies with GWR is rare, but innovative
research has been conducted using GWR to provide insight on what factors impact a
location’s vulnerability as a target. Economists Öcal and Yildirim (2013) used
geographically weighted regression to study terrorism in Turkey. Their research, while
informative, focuses on the behavior of a terrorism index comprised of terrorism-related
incidents, injuries and fatalities--not terrorist safe-houses. Dependent variables are
primarily economic but do include a schooling ratio and dummy variable for coastal
provinces. Analyzing the results of this model design can be challenging, due to the risk
of conflating target selection with agent development. To wit, they assess that increases
in per capita income might increase a location's attractiveness as a target. This
conclusion is logical and borne out in the regression results. They explain that education
and employment might be higher in provinces with lower terror indices because
individuals who are employed or educated would have more to lose if these areas were
hit. This may indeed be true, but this assessment contains an implicit assumption that
terrorists live or work in the areas they target. Moreover, the variable choice conflates
agency, because the analysis also seeks to explain radicalization drivers as well as
incidents, thus conflating two dependent variables. The research presented in this
dissertation acknowledges the value of including economic and educational variables,
but also considers political, social, and religious drivers. Further, it examines geographic
features as candidate independent variables and weighting coefficients to add further
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dimension to the GWR model. The inclusion of geographic features as weights or
variables in their own right was shown to be not applicable in the test case used for this
research, but it could enhance the model in other applications and thus is described in
detail in the chapter "Existing Smuggling Routes", "Border Proximity", and "Micro-level
Variables".

France’s government entities and research institutions collect much of the data
necessary to pursue this research. Institut National de la Statistique et des Études
Économiques—National Institute for Statistics and Economic Studies (INSEE)—is
France's statistical repository. INSEE contains an extensive library of social statistics,
some of which are specific to the commune level. Data.Gouv.Fr, another useful data
source, is France's open data web presence. It consolidates datasets in csv and xlsx
formats from multiple sources, and includes election statistics and data gathered by
many of France's ministries. Eurostat provides statistical data to the European Union
(EU), and hosts a library of publicly available datasets on EU member states. Pew
Research provided data that is the basis for building political representation tables for
testing variables, as well as political opinion polls that were sourced for the analysis.
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IV.

Model Development and Design

The following section explains the development of the regression model, beginning with
an examination of candidate algorithms to determine those most appropriate for
incorporation

in

the

analysis.

Some

of

the

algorithms

were

developed

for

counterterrorism applications, such as insurance industry-related terrorism risk models,
terrorism attack models for national security applications, and models developed by
researchers that identify likely terrorist training sites. Other potential algorithms appear in
models developed by the academic community and are not directly related to terrorism.
Examples of these include statistical modeling of teenage social structures and alcohol
consumption, a kernel weighting function that incorporates geographic space with
attribute space to assess tree-stand patterns, and a spectral clustering algorithm to
identify criminal communities.

Much of the current research that applies predictive modeling techniques to terrorism
concerns risk analysis. The insurance industry is a major patron of such research, as it
is aware that physical structures bear varying risks depending on the context in which
they are situated. Insurers are also aware that that the context is constituted by an
interplay of multiple factors at multiple levels. The challenges involved with producing
accurate assessments of risk levels require the utilization of complex models with
delicately calibrated factors. Yet, successful design and execution of these models is
worth the cost of funding these efforts. Insurance companies risk substantial financial
losses if a structure is situated in a high risk area, or if the implemented security
precautions are inappropriate to the type of risk to which the structure is subjected.
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To that end, RAND’s Center for Terrorism Risk Management Policy has applied the
Probabilistic Terrorism Model designed by Risk Management Solutions to the
examination of terrorism in urban settings. The model is often used by the insurance
industry to assess liabilities associated with potential terrorist attacks. However, its
scope is limited to the United States, and the analyses it generates are based on
scenarios involving attack events on fixed targets. Critical factors in the analyses are
limited to physical qualities, such as explosive type and building design. It is unlikely
that social mechanisms are considered, although this cannot be said for certain, as
detailed information regarding this model’s design is publicly unavailable. The RAND
Corporation was given access to this model for its terrorism research. However, RAND
has used it to study discrete event risks, rather than a continuously unfolding situation to
which such events can be traced.

Another model designed to serve insurance industry counter-terrorism needs is
TerrorRisk, and like the RAND model, it is also focused on potential attack targets.
Simon Sole, CEO of Exclusive Analysis, developed this location-based model with
Pitney-Bowes MapInfo, and he says it enables his clients “…to precisely differentiate
terrorism risk, right down to building level”. (Francica, 2007) TerrorRisk uses Pitney
Bowes MapInfo to analyze 3,700 locations of interest. The model incorporates preassigned numeric coefficients, called “Risk Values”, with an insurance company’s
portfolio to assess its locations’ risks of terrorism-related damage. However, information
on how it develops the coefficients and what algorithm drives the model is not publically
available.
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Products such as Risk Management Solutions’ Probabilistic Terrorism Model and
Exclusive Analysis’ TerrorRisk are of a proprietary nature, so their financial value,
coupled with the security risk that would result from public release, precludes the
possibility of examining these projects in depth. However, some methodologies and their
datasets are publically available.

The Open Source Center (OSC) has modeled terrorist attack incidents in Afghanistan
and Pakistan using 2004-2008 datasets provided by the National Counter-terrorism
Center (NCTC). The geospatial modeling project reveals hot spots that may provide
insight into security vulnerabilities and how stakeholders might address regional
instability. (Open Source Center, 2009)

The OSC project's predictive modeling component uses geographic features common to
most terrorist incidents in the dataset to assess probable locations of future attacks. Its
model resulted in a success rate of nearly 69% for locations deemed of high probability.
While the OSC’s model includes social factors such as roads, population density and
ethnicity, this dissertation will consider other factors as well. The incorporation of these
additional variables should result in a more accurate and granular model if integrated
with sufficient analytical rigor. The proposed model is necessarily more demanding than
the Open Source Center's model, as it endeavors to do other than predict an incident.
Whereas the primary consideration in attack-planning is the target, with success
depending on brief time spans (e.g., the need to access a location just long enough to
execute the attack), safe-houses require more lengthy access, reliable ingress and
egress, and ideally, opportunities to replenish the human resource pool.

Plotting

potential safe-house locations calls for greater intricacy of modeling and weighting but
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the additional effort can result in significant social benefit, as the identification of at-risk
neighborhoods can highlight the need to address issues that will improve the quality of
life in those areas and, by extension, the larger region in which they are located. (Open
Source Center, 2009)

OSC’s work is incident-focused, but counter-terrorism research has also produced
location-focused predictive models. This type of research has been conducted by
Douglas Way. His work concerns the identification of terrorist locations. (Way, 2003)
However, unlike the proposed dissertation research, his work has been focused on
locating training camps in remote regions. Training camps differ from safe-houses both
in purpose and in context. Therefore, the factors contributing to their establishment
differ as well. Additionally, Way’s research extends beyond terrorism with religious or
political underpinnings, as he is also interested in financially-motivated illicit activities,
such as narco-terrorism and arms trafficking.

The broader scope of his research

necessitates the limitation of his work to geo-physical factors such as terrain and
climate. Social variables are generally addressed on superficial levels, consisting of
easily quantifiable attributes as state boundaries and population densities. This reduction
is necessary, as the increased variation among actors reduces the number of common
variables available for consideration.

A variable that Way labels “governance” is the most interesting factor from a social
science perspective. He defines this as “…the ability of a nation to control its people.”
(Way, 2003) Way describes this factor as the most difficult one he assesses in his
research. GIS analyses involve applied mathematical techniques and thus require
quantitative data. Way assigns a numeric value to each country’s “governance” in the
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interest of quantifying a contributing factor that is essentially qualitative. However, this
appears to be the sole qualitative factor under consideration, and he does not describe
his methodology.

In their work entitled Modeling the Co-evolution of Networks and Behavior, Snijders,
Steglich, and Schweinberger (2007) model alcohol consumption among adolescent
friends. They develop a statistical methodology for expressing the relationship between
the behavior of individuals and the social structure within which they are positioned. The
methodology accommodates actor and social group as joint dependent variables and
recognizes the evolutionary nature of this relationship. It is a promising methodological
basis for portions of the proposed research because it not only considers actors within
their social context, but also considers assimilation patterns. The availability of potential
new members is a possible contributing factor to the group’s selection of a site location.

Interestingly, techniques developed to assess tree stand patterns may hold even greater
potential than those used by behaviorists. In Incorporating both Geographical Space and
Attribute Space into the Kernel Weighting Function of Geographically Weighted
Regression, Haijin Shi, Lianjun Zhang, and Jianguo Liu (2005) present a kernel
weighting function incorporating geographical space with what they call “attribute space”.
This function was developed to study the cluster arrangements of tree species, but it can
likely be applied to express spatial arrangements of ethnic group concentrations.

The kernel bandwidth function assigns weights to individual trees based on their
distance from a specified point, which can be either a tree cluster point or, for the
purposes of this proposed research, an ethnic neighborhood. The function decreases in
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weight as the distance increases, so that individuals further away from focal points (or
clusters) are less influenced by them. Thus, the spatial weighting function is expressed
as the exponential decay of the distance (d) with respect to the kernel bandwidth (h):

The kernel bandwidth is the region within which the correlation exists. This region can be
defined in terms of geographical space or attribute space (such as income bracket or
education). The use of an exponential form is a reasonable starting point for depicting
the behavior of geographical space with respect to a selected attribute, as it models the
proportional change in related variables. In the context of the proposed research,
discrepancies between modeled and actual behavior may indicate that either the
relationship does not entail constant proportionality, or that an additional variable
influences the actor’s behavior. A third possibility concerns the data itself, but this form
of equation serves as a reasonable starting point from which to develop a more refined
model.

The attribute weighting function incorporates the function ƒ(τ) which for Shi, et al.,
represents the difference τ between the focal tree and the surrounding trees. The

resulting equation becomes

The regression model developed for this dissertation research uses the kernel
bandwidth function included in the ESRI ArcGIS environment.
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The kernel bandwidth algorithm defines the area around input points within which the
coefficient values are determined. For this model, the input points are the geographic
coordinates of the event locations. The area constitutes the default search radius, or
kernel bandwidth.

The bandwidth is defined by obtaining the mean center of the event points. The
distances between the mean centers are measured to obtain the median of all the
distances (D m ). These results are the basis for calculating the Standard Distance (SD).
The Standard Distance is a single statistic that summarizes the distances that the event
locations deviate from the mean center of the event locations.

These values are applied to the following formula:

1
× 𝐷𝐷𝑚𝑚 � × 𝑛𝑛−0.2
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(2)

𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵ℎ = 0.9 × 𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛 �𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆, �
Where n is the number of event locations.

The identification of current and potential safe-house locations requires an in-depth
evaluation of both geographical and social factors on micro- and macro- levels.
Demographic datasets from INSEE, Eurostat, Data.gouv.fr, and Pew Research provided
the basis for incorporating social and political variables into the model. Geospatial
factors such as the types of roads, neighborhoods, and meeting places were considered
for inclusion in the model. Though these factors were excluded for a variety of reasons
(explained in later sections of this text) from this model, but might well be included were
this model applied to a different test case—or country. Thus, the variable sets are
contextual. Some variables might be influential in France, but have no effect or be
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irrelevant to another country. For instance, local politics might affect daily life far more
than national politics if a central government is weak, or if the political structure dictates
that administration be more diffuse than centralized. Road density might be
inconsequential if the region under study has a robust network throughout.

Gennip, et al (2012) incorporated geographic data with social data to test if the addition
of geographic data improved the accuracy of a model they developed to identify street
gang communities. Their model was designed for cases with limited geosocial data, and
used a spectral clustering algorithm to build network graphs to identify Los Angeles
street gang communities.

Their analysis was based on data obtained from LAPD field interviews of 748 suspected
and confirmed gang members living in high-density gang areas. Graph edge weighting
was based on geosocial similarity between the connecting nodes representing the
interview subjects. To increase the accuracy of the clustering algorithm, Gennip et al.
included connections within gangs to add ground truth noise and thus increase graph
edges (connections that reflect social relationships).

The edge weighting algorithm,

2

𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗 = ∝ 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗 + (1−∝)𝑒𝑒 −𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗 ⁄𝜎𝜎

2

incorporates the Euclidian distance between the average stop locations for nodes i and j.
The variable σ is one standard deviation larger than the mean distance between nodes
representing individuals who were stopped together. Gennip et al found that the σ value
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tended to be constant (1000 feet), enabling the mean distance between i and j to be
substituted for σ. They selected the Gaussian distance kernel at the scale to match most
social interactions in the dataset and based the design of the social similarity coefficient
on the assumption that individuals stopped together share an amicable relationship.
Social similarity was expressed using a Boolean matrix where A i,j = 1 if i = j, meaning
that individuals i and j were stopped together. In all other cases A i,j = 0. Social and
geographic weighting can be incorporated by setting the Boolean α parameter, where
zero designates that only geographic information be considered, and a value of one
designates exclusive use of social information.

Gennip et al. applied spectral clustering to the graph to obtain 31 clusters, based on
LAPD assessment that 31 gangs operate in the area. Their spectral clustering technique
applies the k-means algorithm to the first 31 eigenvectors of the normalized affinity
matrix to obtain binary approximations to indicator functions for the clusters. The kmeans algorithm develops the clusters by iteratively grouping the nodes with their
nearest centroids.

According to Gennip et al., in the gang communities studied, the geographic stability of
gang territories enhanced the accuracy of the analysis, even though data was sparse
and connections could extend beyond the policing area. These characteristics are
shared by France’s northern African and middle-eastern immigrant communities, as they
developed over generations and are thus geographically stable, and their communities
do not conform strictly to policing districts.
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Data was too coarse to incorporate this spectral clustering technique into the dissertation
model. Higher data granularity, such as addresses of event locations and addresses
associated with suspects’ residences—could identify other extremists and indicate other
potential safe-house locations if network analysis could be integrated with the
geographically weighted regression model. This could be achieved by incorporating
metrics generated by the algorithm as regression variables in the GWR model.

Ordinary Least Squares Linear Regression Analysis

Model testing began with Exploratory Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) Regression to
obtain the OLS model with the best fit without considering the impact of geography. The
OLS regression model using the variable combination with the closest fit was compared
with a Geographically Weighted Regression (GWR) model that used the same variable
set. Comparison of the models demonstrated that the most accurate regression model
incorporated geographic weighting and provided the basis for the analysis of the
regression results.

Ordinary least squares (OLS) analysis—Linear Regression analysis—uses least squares
to determine how a set of independent variables can best predict the behavior of a
dependent variable.

OLS produces a linear equation that incorporates the independent variable coefficients
and returns dependent variable values. The returned values are compared with the
dataset of observed dependent variable values to assess the accuracy—or fit—of the
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regression model by squaring and averaging the distances from the data points to the
line. The least squared value—shortest distance from the line—is used to construct the
regression line. This technique is limited, as it produces a linear model and assumes
constant variance among the error estimates for each measure. It does not incorporate
temporal, or spatial variations of the datapoints. This type of regression analysis was
conducted before the geographically weighted regression analysis, firstly, to evaluate
which candidate variables should be included in the model and, secondly, to compare
the results of both regression techniques to assess the relevance of including a spatial
component in the analysis.

Exploratory Regression Analysis to Identify Optimal Model

Exploratory regression analysis is a necessary precursor to conducting OLS analysis
when the behavior and impact of multiple candidate variables on an independent
variable is not well understood. Exploratory OLS tests multiple candidate variables to
determine which combination of coefficients produces an equation whose dependent
variable output most closely resembles the observed data. This technique also identifies
multicollinearity that must be eliminated to accurately evaluate each variable’s
contribution to the model. Multicollinearity—correlation between candidate coefficients—
prevents successful assessment of each variable’s influence on the dependent variable.
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Exploratory Regression Analysis Candidate Variables

Data and time constraints limited the choice and number of variables under
consideration. Variable selection was based on social science literature, dataset
availability, and the goal of analyzing research results in a timely manner. Candidate
variables that were considered but not included in the exploratory regression are
discussed in the section, “Factors Excluded from the Regression Analysis”. Variables
were excluded for a variety of reasons that are explained in depth in that section and
that generally relate to the unavailability of a dataset or an analytic assessment that,
while a variable might affect candidacy of an area as a safe-house location, that variable
is not applicable to France.

Central to this realization is the caveat that the geographically weighted regression
model presented in this research is not a global model. One should not simply insert
another country’s equivalent datasets and expect to generate a regression model with a
good fit, even if that model is geographically weighted. Variations in government
structure, the catalogue of factors that comprise the social environment, and
characteristics of geographic terrain that shape the geostrategic and social
environments, can necessitate the incorporation of variables that are not applicable to
France’s situation. Every region is unique in this sense. The variables excluded in this
model might be critical to a model designed for a different region. In quantitative models
of social science phenomena, especially those with a geospatial component, dataset
exclusions are often related to the data itself. The dataset might not be designed such
that it can be incorporated into a model. Different scales, formats, date ranges, and
levels of granularity represent a small sample of the obstacles that a social scientist or
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geospatial analyst might encounter in the course of his or her research. The
methodology however, is widely applicable, and in this sense the geographically
weighted multi-variate regression model presented here can serve as a foundation for
the design of similar models for other geographic regions.

The variables included in the exploratory regression are the percentage of graduate
degree holders per departmental arrondissement in 2008, GINI standard of living index
per department in 2008, percentage of Algerian-Moroccan-Tunisian-Turkish immigrants
in 2011, percentage ethnic North African and middle eastern representation in municipal
government in 2008, burglaries per department in 2008, presence of one or more
Sensitive Urban Zones (ZUS) per arrondissement, 11 percentage of unemployed per
department in 2008, percentage of population aged 15-64 with only primary school
education by departmental arrondissement in 2008, and declared taxable revenue per
departmental arrondissement in 2008.

The graphs below show correlations between each candidate variable considered in the
exploratory regression models and arrest/raid events.

11

Please see section, “Proximity to Sensitive Urban Zones” for explanation of ZUS.
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Figure 1. Scatterplots for Candidate Variables vs. Events 12

12
“Event” is a datapoint that references the residence of an arrested terrorist suspect or the
location of a raid site.
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Table 1. Summary of OLS Results
Variable

Coefficient
[a]

Std.
Error

tProbability
Statistic
[b]

Robust
SE

Robust
T

Robust
Pr
[b]

Variance
Inflation
Factor [c]

Intercept

0.002409

0.033344 0.072243

0.942436

0.035566 0.06773 0.946026

Graduates

-0.016031

0.003202 -5.00726

0.000001*

0.005089

0.001785
3.15029
*

1.594625

Burglaries

0.000033

0.00001

3.396878

0.000774*

0.00002

1.66080

0.09767

1.642839

Income

0.000019

0.000001 20.36246

0.000000*

0.000002 8.07699 0.000000
*

1.345643

--------

Ordinary Least Squares Diagnostics

Table 2. OLS Diagnostic Statistics Summary
Input Features:
Number of Observations:
Multiple R-Squared [d]:
Joint F-Statistic [e]:
Joint Wald Statistic [e]:
Koenker (BP) Statistic [f]
Jarque-Bera Statistic [g]:
Dependent Variable:
Akaike's Information Criterion (AICc) [d]:
Adjusted R-Squared [d]:
Model Variables

Observed Events
350
0.613722
183.242935
87.004074
53.176187
2860.941648
EVENTS
243.804925
0.610373
-PRCGRADDEG +INCOME_2008 +BURG2008

Testing Auto-Correlation for OLS Multivariable Regression Analysis

A Morans I spatial correlation test was performed against the multi-variable OLS model
prior to conducting geographically weighted regression to evaluate clustering distribution
of deviating predictions. If the error terms are randomly distributed, the variables are

37

likely sufficiently explaining the observed data, and it is unlikely that a crucial variable is
omitted from the model.

Selected Parameters:
Input field: Standard Residual
Conceptualization of Spatial Relationships: INVERSE_DISTANCE

I selected the inverse distance method because social phenomena do not behave
discretely--nearby features and phenomena have a mutual influence. It is a safe
assessment that for this research, the distant features have a reduced impact on each
other. The inverse distance method estimates a point’s predicted attribute value from the
weighted average of the values of proximate points. The value weights are inversely
related to the distance between the prediction and the samples, and are modified by a
constant power parameter p. As p increases, the distant weights decrease and reach
zero, and at very high p values only the nearest points weight the prediction. If p = 0, the
prediction will be the mean of all the neighboring data values. The inverse distance
squared weighted interpolation sets p = 2. It is ArcGIS’s default value and was the
selected parameter for this analysis.

Distance method: Euclidean
Standardization: None
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The results appear below:

Figure 2. Spatial autocorrelation and global Moran's I statistical summaries

Geographically weighted regression was conducted to determine if there might be a
spatial component that would cause an independent variable’s influence to change
depending on location. Below is an explanation of the parameters selected for the GWR
analysis.

Bandwidth and Kernel type

AICc (Akaike Information Criterion) Bandwidth: For this analysis, AICc was used to
facilitate analysis of multiple regression models. AICc estimates the information loss that
results from using a given model to predict the behavior of the observed data. It is purely
a comparative metric, so there is no typical value range for any field of research or type
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of regression model. The lowest AICc value among the candidate models reflects the
model with the least information loss of all the models under consideration.

The AICc value can be used to determine the optimal number of neighbors for the
estimations. For this analysis, AICc bandwidth units were determined using an adaptive
Kernel setting, since feature class density varied throughout the geographic space.

GWR and OLS results appear below:

Table 3. Comparison of OLS and GWR statistics

Measure

OLS

GWR

Neighbors

64

Residual Squares

24.287611477887584

Effective Number

63.974417936184381

Sigma (estimated standard
deviation of the residuals)

0.29140027981237099

AICc

243.804925

178.58006025877796

R2

0.613722

0.76514907676923771

R2Adjusted

0.610373

0.71344181308492494

The OLS model had an AICc value of 243.805, whereas the GWR model had an AIC of
178.580, an indication that the geographically weighted regression model would be a
better fit than the ordinary least squares model.

The OLS model’s adjusted R-squared value is 0.61, lower than the adjusted R-squared
value of.71 in the GWR model.
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V.

Geographically Weighted Regression—Model Variables

The geographically weighted regression analysis incorporates three variables as model
coefficients—income, burglary and graduate degree holders. The income coefficient is
based on the total declared household income per department in 2008. The burglary
coefficient is based on the percentage of burglaries per overall population aged 15-64
per department in 2008. The graduate degree coefficient is based on the percentage of
graduate degree holders per population aged 15-64 per department in 2008.

Figure 3. Map Showing Local R Squared Coefficient Strengths
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The local R squared map shows how closely the model adheres to the observed data—
the darker the color, the more closely the model fits the observed events. The lightest
shade—corresponding to a local R squared value below .50—reflects those areas where
the model predictions are no better than chance occurrences. As shown in the map, the
model accuracy varies spatially. For this reason, geographically weighted regression
analysis was favored over ordinary least squares regression analysis, which does not
consider spatial variability. 13

A comparison of model statistics provides quantitative

evidence that GWR produces a more accurate model.

The model fits best (71 to 87%) in the southeastern and southwestern regions. Roughly
speaking, the regions are analogous to Provence Alpes-Cote-d’Azure, Midi-Pyrenees,
Languedoc-Roussillon, and Aquitaine, and south-western Bourgogne in central-east.
The region with the weakest fit is a north central to north eastern region that stretches
down to the center west to Poitou-Charente and Limousin. Later sections will examine
why this region is a poor fit.

Household Income

The income coefficient reflects the total taxable household income per departmental
arrondissement in 2008.

A body of academic research concludes that extremists tend to be located in poorer
areas or areas where there is less policing which also tend to be lower income.

13

Rejected OLS and GWR models appear in the appendix.
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Researchers such as Townsend, Niebuhr, and Fields, examine the influence of
individual factors on radicalization. Proponents of theories that low education, low
opportunity, and low income correlate with radicalization tend to deconstruct one or more
terrorist activities and equate aspects of the extremism with other anti-social behaviors.
For example, the violence and illicit fund-raising activities associated with terrorism are
seen as criminal acts.

The tendency to lump terrorist activities with “conventional” crime is fueled by revelations
that terrorists and organized crime groups sometimes cross paths and even work
together. Garry Reid, deputy assistant secretary of defense for special operations and
combating terrorism informed the Senate Armed Services Committee’s emerging threats
and capabilities subcommittee that terrorists are employing criminal tactics to finance
their operations and in some cases, have formally cooperated to achieve a common
end. (Parrish, 2012)

Though there is sometimes a functional overlap, designating terrorism as a criminal type
can hinder analysis, primarily because extremists and criminals do not share the same
motivations. Thus, crime theory alone is not an adequate mechanism with which to
understand radicalization.

Other theorists highlight the apparent self-destructive, high-risk behavior associated with
terrorism—especially

suicide

terrorism—and

apply

psychological

theories

that

characterize terrorism as desperate actions perpetrated by those who believe they have
nothing to live for. Ellen Townsend (Townsend, 2007) asks if terrorists are suicidal.
Niebuhr (1960) notes that politically-motivated self-immolators commit suicide to elicit
sympathy from others, and do not aim to kill others in the process. Individuals who
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commit these acts generally object to being characterized as performing a suicidal act.
They view their action as ijtihad, sacrificing their lives to Allah—not as self-immolation.
According to Fields, et al (2002) (Fields, Elbedour, & Hein, 2002) 14 interviews of families
of suicide attackers, most family members characterized them as deeply religious. This
is not generally a quality shared by others who self-immolate under emotional
depression. In fact, empirical research reveals that religiosity often prevents one from
committing suicide, because most religions forbid it. 15 While many of those who attempt
suicide cite a desire to escape a painful situation, the majority of suicide attackers cite
harm visited upon them or their relatives as a motivation. 16

In addition to the analytic errors associated with attempts to understand radicalization
within inappropriate frameworks, deconstruction itself is a risky analytic technique when
applied to social science topics. Integrative approaches can offer more insights because
they recognize that human behavior is driven by a complex interplay of multimodal
variables, psychological, historical, and geospatial. Geographically weighted regression
analysis is one such approach, well-designed interview studies are another.

GWR results indicate that income is positively correlated with events in areas where the
model shows the strongest predictive power (See map below). This discovery is
consistent with the findings of other empirical research studies.

14

Cited in Townsend.

15

Dervic et al. 2004. From Ellen Townsend.

16

Kushner, 1996.And Bancroft et al. 1979. Both in Ellen Townsend.
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Figure 4. Map Showing GWR Coefficient Strength for the Variable, “Household Income”,
per Department, 2008 INSEE data.

Research on the correlation of wealth with violent extremism (specifically, suicide
bombers) from the Palestinian territories identified positive links. Berrebi (2003), found
that Palestinian suicide bombers were rarely from impoverished households. According
to Berrebi, who studied the biographies of 335 Palestinian terrorists, “…those with higher
education and higher living standards are more likely to participate in terrorist activity….”
(Berrebi, 2007, 2)
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Shafiq and Sinno (2009) examine correlations of income and education—two of the
geographically weighted regression model coefficients—with an individual’s support for
suicide bombing attacks on civilians in their countries, and on Western military and
political personnel in Iraq. Their research is based on 2005 public opinion data from
residents of Indonesia, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Pakistan and Turkey. Comparison of
their findings is limited to support for attacks on civilians in their home countries. This is
because support for these attacks might vary due to the attacks occurring far from home
and are unlikely to affect the respondents or their immediate social groups in the latter
case. For France, the context of ethnic group support of extremists storing weapons,
recruiting, and living in their midst more closely resembles the context in which
respondents are queried on their support of suicide attackers on civilians in their
residential (home country) environment. Comparison is also limited to two countries—
Turkey and Morocco—as ethnicity data for French departments was unavailable for
other ethnic groups in Shafiq and Sinno’s study. Shafiq and Sinno found no significant
correlation between income and support for suicide bombing. The areas where the
GWR’s strongest predictive ability coincides with the highest proportion of Turkish and
Moroccan populations are Bretagne, Languedoc Roussillon, and western Provence Alps
Cote d’Azur.

One potential explanation for the observation that safe-houses are more likely to be
found in wealthier areas is that police might put more energy into fostering positive
relationships with members of the communities, resulting in a greater willingness on the
part of residents to support the police. This would result in a better network of informants
who would notify the police whenever they have reason to believe that extremists are
stashing weapons or recruiting members. This explanation would also fit the behavior of
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the burglary coefficient described in the following section, and could be relevant to other
countries that show similar coefficient behavior-event correlation.

However, this

explanation does not appear to apply to France, as the section, “Police-Community
Relationships” details research that counters this conclusion.

Education Beyond College

Though educational level is a predictor in the regression model, the nature of its
correlation—most notably in high local R2 areas in the south and northeastern areas of
France—varies with respect to the geographic region (see map below). This variable
more than any other, demonstrates the importance of incorporating a geographic
component into the analysis.
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Figure 5. Map Showing GWR Coefficient Strength for the Variable, "Education Beyond
College", per Department, 2008 INSEE data.

The impact of geography as a determinant is evident from other empirical research, as
well. Analysis of social, political and historical context provides insight as to why a
coefficient has a positive or negative influence for a particular ethnic group. Sinno and
Shafiq talk about cultural issues associated with extremist sentiment.

Shafiq and Sinno’s research on suicide attackers reveals variations in education,
depending on the attacker’s country of origin. They find that any correlation between
education and support for suicide attacks is difficult to detect, as those with limited
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education were less likely to express their opinion, opting instead to select “don’t
know/Refused” in answering the questions.

Among those who did answer in Morocco and Turkey, both of which are countries of
origin for many Muslim immigrants to France, Shafiq and Sinno found no significant
correlation between education and support for suicide attacks on civilians. GWR analysis
shows that in departments having the highest proportion of ethnic Turkish and Moroccan
populations, the education coefficient has the weakest determining influence. Thus, the
behavior of the GWR and the behavior of its education and income coefficients is
consistent with Shafiq and Sinno’s observation that education and income are weak
predictors of support for extremism among Turkish and Moroccan populations. 17

In France, Turkish departmental population percentages range from 0.1 percent and
23.4 percent of the immigrant population. However, Turkish populations tend to be
concentrated in areas where the model has the weakest fit. A comparatively high Turkish
population—between 8.1 and 23.4 percent—exists in some areas of the GWR model
that have a moderately high local R2—between .51 and .70—somewhat high for a social
science regression model. These upper range R2 areas are: Bretagne (Morbihan), Pays
de la Loire (Maine-et-Loire), and Rhone-Alpes (Drome). Higher education is negatively
or positively correlated, or shows no significant correlation, depending on department. In

17

At time of this research, I was unable to obtain data on France’s ethnic percentages for other
ethnic groups studied by Shafiq and Sinno.
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departments where a correlation is present, in Morbihan it is positively correlated, but in
Maine-et-Loire and Drome it is negatively correlated. 18

Thus, where the model results demonstrate the best fit, there is no significant correlation
between highly educated Turkish populations and event locations—consistent with
Shafiq’s and Sinno’s observation of no significant correlation of highly educated
residents in Turkey with support for suicide bombers.

18
In the Auvergne region the higher education coefficient is neutral in the north and weakly
positive in the south.
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Figure 6. Map Showing Percentage Turkish Ethnicity by Department, 2011 INSEE data.
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Figure 7. Map Highlighting Departments with Highest Turkish Ethnic Percentages in High
Local R Squared Areas.

France’s Moroccan departmental population percentages range from 1.9 percent to 42.2
percent of all immigrants. A comparatively high percentage of ethnic Moroccans—
between 14.9 percent and 42.2 percent—exist in areas where the local R2 is between
.70 and .87— the upper range of the regression model’s local R2, and thus where it
demonstrates the best fit. These upper range R2 areas are: Aquitaine (Lot-et-Garonne,
Gironde), Midi-Pyrenees (Tarn-et-Garonne, Tarn), Auvergne (Haute Loire), Languedoc
Roussillon (Gard, Aude, Herault), Provence-Alpes-Cote d’Azur (Vaucluse, Bouche du
Rhone, Var), Rhone Alpes (Drome). Higher education correlation in the Moroccan areas
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is similar to that of the Turkish areas in that it varies widely. It is positive, negative, or
shows no significant correlation, depending on the department. In departments where a
correlation is present, higher education is positively correlated with the probability of an
arrest/raid location in Aquitaine (Lot-et-Garonne), Midi-Pyrenees (Tarn-et-Garonne,
Tarn) and Auvergne (Haute Loire), but negatively correlated in Languedoc Roussillon
(Gard, Herault), Provence-Alpes-Cote d’Azur (Vaucluse, Bouche du Rhone, Var), and
Rhone Alpes (Drome). There was no correlation in Aquitaine (Gironde) and Languedoc
Roussillon (Aude).
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Figure 8. Map Showing Percentage Moroccan Ethnicity by Department, 2011 INSEE data.

This erratic correlation range for areas with higher Turkish and Moroccan concentration
explains the exclusion of ethnic concentration as a model variable. According to the
regression model results, ethnicity—at least among the ethnic groups for which data
could be included in this research—is not a determining factor for the establishment of a
safe-house location. These results are consistent with Shafiq and Sinno’s conclusions
that there is no significant correlation between higher educational attainment with
support for suicide bombers among Moroccan residents who were surveyed.
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Figure 9. Map Highlighting Departments with Highest Moroccan Ethnic Percentages in
High Local R Squared Areas, Showing Graduate Degree Coefficient Chloropeth.

Why does higher education’s predictive value vary according to ethnicity?

Any attempt to answer this question requires an in-depth investigation of the context in
which these ethnic groups develop, and may or may not be linked to the quality of
education or the enhanced income opportunities for graduate degree holders in that
environment. Shafiq and Sinno explain that in Turkey, higher education correlates with
secular views.
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There is usually a negative correlation between the percentages of the population aged
15 to 29 years old with education degrees beyond that of college and the presence of
events. 19 Areas where the correlation is positive are generally areas where the overall
model is a weak predictor. Taking the model at face value, educated communities
discourage the establishment of extremist safe-houses. But what mechanism associated
with higher education exerts this effect?

Professor Kamaldeep Bhui’s (2014) research team at Queen Mary University of London
interviewed 600 Pakistanis, Bangladeshi, and Muslim people in London and Bradford
between the ages of 18 and 45. The study found no evidence substantiating a link
between inequality-related grievances and radicalization. Further, Professor Professor
Kamaldeep Bhui (Bhui, 2014) stated to al-Jazeera that his team’s research did not
reveal, "…what factors make potential recruits open to persuasion to join a terrorist
movement…”. (Pizzi, 2014) Similarly, further research is required before one can offer
insights into why and how advanced education could contribute to radicalization. Any
attempts to shed light on this link necessitate speculation, but the GWR results might
indicate a starting point for such research.

19

I used 29 as the cut-off year because the next age bracket included everyone over the age of
30. I was concerned that inclusion of the over-70 population might skew the data. The over-70
population includes generations where undergraduate degrees might have been valued
differently, be it changing educational standards or different degree requirements necessary for
gaining desirable employment.
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Answering the Why—Income and Education Through the Lens of GINI

A possible explanation for the positive influence of higher education on the
establishment of extremist safe-houses might be found from examining the GINI
Standard of Living Index.

The GINI Standard of Living Index measures levels of

inequality among living standards. It does not measure the quality of the living standard
itself, but rather the disparity of living standards within a specific area. For example, a
GINI living index of zero reflects a perfect equality among residents, but does not
indicate whether or not that living standard is high or low.

Relative Deprivation Theory posits a positive correlation between high education and
violent behaviors (such as crime and terrorism). A logical extension of the theory is that
terrorism tends to develop in areas where there is a stark contrast in living standards,
because those less fortunate are regularly exposed to the trappings of the higher class,
and thus there are constant reminders that they are less well-off. Ted Robert Gurr
(1970) writes of this theory in Why Men Rebel, in which he explains that the gap
between expected and achieved welfare generates violence born of frustration when
individuals see no way to attain the lifestyle they feel they deserve. One would expect
this frustration to be more acute if an individual follows societal rules and acquires an
advanced degree, only to discover additional obstacles that academic achievement will
not remove. Thus, proponents of this theory might argue that areas are more at risk to
hosting a safe-house if there is quality of life disparity, or where those who enjoy a high
quality of life live near or among those less fortunate.
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Data note on educational attainment: To address that hypothesis, data on the
percentage of higher education graduates in 2008 were analyzed with data on 2011
executive and professional employment. The reasoning for the time gap is to allow three
years for graduates to obtain and be promoted into executive and professional positions
commensurate with their education and skill level. Regression with these variables
produced a Durbin-Watson statistic of 2.24. The Durbin-Watson statistic measures the
correlation between adjacent error terms and returns values between 0 and 4. A DurbinWatson statistic close to zero indicates a positive autocorrelation. If the statistic is close
to 4 the autocorrelation is negative. In this instance, the Durbin-Watson statistic was very
close to 2, indicating the absence of autocorrelation between those with graduate
degrees and those holding professional or executive positions.

To gain insight into whether or not Relative Deprivation Theory can explain event
presence, departments with a high GINI index were examined. Income and higher
education coefficients were examined for arrondissements within high GINI departments
that had at least one event. Results supporting this theory would show events in low
income and low graduate degree areas. In such cases, one explanation would be that
the living standard disparity is a source of frustration and resentment for those with less
education who reason that they could not improve their standard of living because they
lack the education necessary to secure a white-collar position. A different result that
would also support the theory is the presence of events in arrondissements with low
income and high graduate degree coefficients. In such cases, the explanation consistent
with the theory asserts that graduate degree holders in low income areas are vulnerable
to engaging in anti-social behavior. They have followed societal rules and deferred
rewards to meet the challenges associated with obtaining a higher education with the
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intent of bettering their lifestyle. When the graduate degree ceases to show promise of
opening the door to a profitable career they become disillusioned and anti-social.

GINI indices ranged from 21.13 for Aurillac, Mauriac, and Saint-Flour in Cantal, through
36.08 for Nanterre in Hauts-de-Seine and 42.23 for Paris. Departments in the GINI
index brackets over 28 contained 33 out of the 50 events in this study. In descending
order and with events in parentheses, they are Paris (9), Bouches-du-Rhône (6), HauteGaronne (4), Alpes-Maritimes (3), Hérault (2), Rhône (2), Seine-Saint-Denis (2), Var (1),
and Vaucluse (1). These events were not concentrated in low income arrondissements,
but the distribution does not necessarily eliminate relative deprivation as a driver. In
areas such as Paris and Lyon (in Rhône), the GINI index might be high within—not just
among—arrondissements, as high income neighborhoods can abut low income
neighborhoods. The news reports that serve as the source of the event data rarely
specified the address of the raid or arrest location, preventing confident assessments as
to the proportion of events in low income neighborhoods. However, in reports that did
specify the neighborhood where the events occurred, biographic information in the news
articles appears to support relative deprivation theory, if only in the context that certain
raids occurred in low income areas.

For example, in 2002 20 Mourad Benchellali, his brother Menad, and his father Chellali
Benchellali (a Muslim cleric) were arrested in 2002 on terrorism charges.

The

Benchellalis were residents of Venissieux, a low income suburb in Lyon. These arrests
are not included in the research data because they pre-date the study’s time window that

20
Although 2002 falls outside the date range of the regression data, it is temporally proximal and
thus likely reflects the context of the events within the research data.
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scopes the analysis to events occurring between 2008 and 2012. However, the 2002
arrest provides weight to the argument that the Lyon events appearing in this study
might well have occurred in low income neighborhoods. This is especially true given the
recent arrests in 2014, when two teenage girls—one a resident of Venissieux—were
arrested for planning to bomb the Great Synagogue of Lyon. 21

Another example is Marseille (in Bouches-du- Rhône). Marseille appears as a high
income, high GINI area, when in reality it contains both high and low income
neighborhoods. Two arrests in 5 October 2010 reportedly occurred in southeastern
Marseille, but even this is not sufficient granularity to determine whether or not the
suspects lived in a low income neighborhood.

Since nearly 2/3 of the events occurred in high GINI index departments, a high GINI
index would appear to be an influential variable but it never appeared as a coefficient in
the strongest models over multiple iterations of OLS and GWR analyses. GINI could
actually be a weaker determinant than income or crime because while most events
occur in high GINI areas, enough events appear in very low GINI areas to weaken the
influence of the index as a coefficient, and some high GINI departments do not have
event occurrences, though this cannot be said without caveat based on the small sample
size and the narrow time frame of analysis. It is possible that relative deprivation is a
driver only when other factors are in play, such as high education coupled with high
income. However, lack of specific information on the locations of many of the events
prevents a confident assessment of this variable’s impact.

21

The other girl resided in Tarbes, Hautes-Pyrenees.
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It is possible that in France, lower income neighborhoods in high GINI areas are
vulnerable to developing safehavens for advocates of violent extremism. This could be
true for other nations, but the impact of the coefficient combination of high education,
high income, somewhat lower crime coefficient, and high GINI index might not be as
potent if other variables have sufficient strength to significantly impact the model.

The graph below shows the correlation of events with a combined income-percentage
graduate degree holders coefficient for arrondissements and other district types within
departments having GINI indices of 28 or higher. Paris and Marseille data are excluded
from the graph due to the lack of location granularity. Most of the news articles reporting
Paris and Marseille raids did not specify the arrondissement, and both cities contain
many districts of widely varying income levels.

Figure 10. Number of Events and Corresponding GINI Indices of Departments.

The coefficient behavior is erratic for GINI indices below 36, but beyond 36, the trend
generally increases.
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Impact of High Education and High Income—Getting to the Why

A 2014 Queen Mary University of London research study links wealth, full-time
education, and youth with radicalization and in so doing, corroborates the geographically
weighted regression research in this dissertation. Professor Kamaldeep Bhui’s (Bhui,
2014) research team interviewed 600 Pakistanis, Bangladeshi, and Muslim people in
London and Bradford between the ages of 18 and 45. Sympathy for violent ideologicallymotivated protests and terrorist activity was highest among those under 20 who were
unemployed full-time students. Sympathy levels were also highest in the sample portion
that earned over £75,000 per year. The study identified those in the pre-radicalization
stage, a point in the radicalization process where intervention measures are likely to
prevent an individual’s transition to a rigid extremist mindset.

22

Nasra Hassan (Hassan, 2001) interviewed approximately 250 Palestinian extremists
from 1996 to 1999.

All the individuals interviewed either had attempted suicide

missions, their family members, or mission trainers. According to Hassan, none of the
would-be suicide attackers were poor or uneducated. Most were middle class,
employed, and in the case of two volunteers, children of millionaires. Hanadi Jaradat
came from a well-to-do Palestinian family and graduated law school before dying via
suicide attack on a Haifa restaurant in 2003 (Victor, Raising a Generation of Martyrs,
2003).

The “why” is challenging to address. Even with additional, in-depth, interview-based
studies motivation is difficult to determine, given that subjects might not be forthcoming

22
Kamaldeep Bhui, Professor of Cultural Psychiatry & Epidemiology, Queen Mary University
London.
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in their responses, and their root motivations might not be clear to themselves. Azam
(2010) suggests that higher education often requires young people to move far from their
families, and they become vulnerable to social pressure as they strive to replace
loosened family ties with other social connections that are familial in nature. These
young, highly educated people might be vulnerable to stronger personalities who
encourage them to replace links to their biological families with those of a new, extremist
family.

Marc Sageman (2004) reaches a similar conclusion, based on interviews and
biographical studies of 172 jihadists. Although a majority (approximately 60%) of his
subjects received a minimum of some college education, their education was secular—
most often in the physical sciences. They rarely, if ever, had a background in theology.
He notes several extremist leaders—Qutb, Faraj, al-Zawahiri—were not religious clerics.
The regression analysis in this study does not subdivide education into disciplines.
Additionally, the sample size (50 events) is too small to enable quantitative analysis
using subdivisions of the graduate education variable.
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Crime

Crime data is represented by burglary percentage of population per department (INSEE,
2008 data). INSEE stores data on burglaries, vehicle thefts, robberies, and murders at
department-level granularity. The inclusion of crime-related datasets produced
autocorrelation errors in the exploratory regression model, as the data increased and
decreased similarly among the datasets. The burglary dataset was selected because the
regression analysis required that single representative dataset for criminal activity.
Burglary numbers were normalized as percentages of the population per department.
The burglary chloropeth map appears to depict a positive correlation between burglaries
and events.

However, the burglary coefficient map (shown below) appears to indicate an inverse
correlation, as it depicts events occurring in blue areas in the region where the local R2
values are strongest. So how can burglaries negatively correlate with events when the
burglary event map appears to show a positive correlation? The answer might lie in the
manner in which the coefficients temper each other’s influence within the model.

To better understand the behavior of the burglary coefficient, geographically weighted
regression was conducted using only burglary percentages as an independent variable.
The map below depicts the influence of this coefficient on predicting safe-house
locations.
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Figure 11. Map Showing GWR Coefficient Strength for the Variable, “Crime” (Burglary
Percentages per Population), per Department, 2008 INSEE data.

When considered in isolation, the burglary coefficient has banded regions and degrees
of influence (shown in map below), and generally, this coefficient positively correlates
with event locations where the local R2 if the multi-variable model is strongest. The
burglary coefficient does not exert this effect in the multi-variable model, because other
coefficients come into play to adjust the weight of the burglary coefficient. The inclusion
of the other variables contributes significantly to the model’s accuracy, as the single
coefficient GWR model has an adjusted R2 value of only 0.174, indicating that burglaries
only explain 17.4% of the likelihood of an event occurring in a predicted location.
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Figure 12. Map Showing GWR Coefficient Strength for the Variable, “Crime” (Burglary
Percentages per Population) in a Single Variable Regression Analysis, 2008 INSEE data.

The burglary coefficient’s weak predictive ability is shown in the scatterplot below by the
datapoints indicating that there are multiple departments with high burglary rates but no
events.
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Figure 13. Scatterplot Showing Weak Correlation between Burglaries and Events per
Department

Examination of the low burglary-high raid correlation could also provide insight as to why
safe-houses were discovered in high income as well as low income arrondissements in
high GINI areas. Sharp income disparities within arrondissements that obscure the
actual income level of a raid location might be one explanation. This explanation could
neither be verified nor ruled out, because the raid reports rarely listed the raid location
with sufficient granularity to make an assessment.

An alternative explanation for the occasionally inverse correlation between burglaries
and raid locations concerns law enforcement’s relationships with the communities they
serve. This explanation posits that police have a greater and more consistent presence
in high income communities, resulting in lower burglary rates. They might also have a
less adversarial relationship with residents, given that burglary and robbery suspects
usually live outside those communities, thus police are often conducting unpleasant
interviews elsewhere. The less adversarial relationship might translate into a more
informative one, where residents feel comfortable reporting suspicious activity.
Therefore, police might have superior intelligence networks in higher income
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communities, as residents more readily come forward to tell the police when they hear of
or see something suspicious, and their information yields successful raids.

This explanation implies that there might be undiscovered safe-houses in other high
burglary departments, but we are not aware of them because the residents rarely
volunteer information to the police. If this explanation is correct, the fact that events are
clustered in a few high burglary departments implies that we might discover more safehouses if police had better intelligence in these areas.

Police-Community Relationships

Research on community policing and communities’ relationships with local law
enforcement in France does not support the hypothesis that more raids in lower crime
communities is a reflection of a better community relationship generating a better
intelligence network.

The French government has improved local law enforcement-

community relationships as a result of a 30-year effort to encourage cooperation
between the two sectors, elements of 19th century policing attitudes are still pervasive.
Rather than seeking to function as partners, each views the other as an outsider. The
police see themselves as professionals who know their jobs better than anyone else,
and thus perceive community participation in crafting and implementing policies as
amateur attempts to usurp their authority. The residents tend to view law enforcement as
strangers who enter their neighborhoods and demand that they come forward to report
suspicious activity. The residents also resent police telling their community leaders to
implement policies that are not tailored to the community’s needs. French policy-makers
are well-aware of the sociological, behavioral, and economic factors contributing to crime
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rates and have implemented initiatives and political structures to address the problem.
(Jones & Wiseman, 2006)

In 2002, the French parliament directed municipal governments to establish Local
Security and Crime Prevention Councils, which transferred crime-fighting and crimesuppression responsibilities to the local communities.

The restructuring of France’s

security apparatus coincided with a pilot program that provided community policing
training to local law enforcement officers and interagency outreach teams with
residential participation.

Unfortunately, while there has been progress, there remains much progress to be made.
Police continue to design and implement policies without consulting the communities
they serve, and rarely record or respond to resident complaints. Public meetings
between law enforcement and residents are not well-attended, and civilians who do
attend report that they hear crime statistics and directives to report suspicious activity,
but are not asked for their input. Crime fighting policies continue to be designed and
implemented with a top-down approach, rather than through a cooperative relationship.

However, this tense relationship is not limited to one class or community—it appears to
affect white-collar, blue-collar, and immigrant communities.

Arthur A. Jones and Robin Wiseman (2006) argue that the adversarial environment
creates “no-go zones” that police avoid. They assert that these are high crime areas with
immigrant youth populations that feel marginalized and ignored because police won’t
enter to maintain order and stability. They also assert that these youth have formed
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terrorist cells within these zones. However, the regression models evaluated in this
research show no significant correlation with Sensitive Urban Zones (ZUS)—the socalled “no-go” zones—and North African and middle-eastern immigrant populations.
Further, the regression models show no significant correlation of arrest/raid events with
areas of proportionately high ethnic Muslim populations. These findings comport with
those of Finney and Simpson (2006), whose research on UK terrorist suspects’
geographic origins shows that “…Muslims charged with terrorism under UK legislation
are no more likely to come from districts where the proportion of Muslims are highest,
than from other districts.” (Finney & Simpson, 2006). Many of the 752 ZUS do not have
proportionally significant North African and Middle Eastern populations. Furthermore, the
regression analyses revealed no significant correlation of the presence of a ZUS with an
arrest or raid event. Lastly, Jones and Wiseman provide no evidence of terrorist youth
gangs in these zones. If they do have quantifiable information, French law enforcement
officials would likely welcome the information.

Coefficient Behavior in High Local R2 Areas

The first aspect of this analysis focuses on areas where the Local R2 shows the best
model fit—the southern and then the northwestern region in Pays de la Loire. The
southern areas show a weak positive correlation between burglaries and events,
negative correlations between income and events, but a mix of positive and negative
correlation with respect to the correlation between graduate degree holders and events.
This behavior counters much of the conventional wisdom in security studies theory.
Keeping in mind that correlation does not necessarily mean causation, insights into
these coefficients might be gleaned from an examination of the events recorded in these
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areas. Every incident with the exception of one event in Albi occurred in Toulouse.
Several arrests were connected with the investigation into Mohammad Merah, and 17
arrests were connected to suspected followers of Forsane Alizza chief Mohamed
Achamlane. 23

In Toulouse, income and education coefficients exert a weak positive influence on event
probability, but crime exerts a weak negative influence. According to the model, the
more education and income a Toulouse resident has, the higher the probability the
resident will tolerate or support a haven for extremists. The chloropeth map of average
household income by per department highlights the economic contrast of Toulouse with
the surrounding departments.

23
Bruguière provides details on the various networks active at the time in Jean-Louis Bruguière
and Jean-Marie Pontaut, Ce Que Je N’ai Pas Pu Dire, (Paris: Laffont, 2009), pp.443-463.
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Figure 14. Average Declared Departmental Household Income, INSEE 2008 Data.

However, it would be premature to make the analytic leap that in Toulouse, the wealthier
a resident is, the more likely he is to look out the window over an evening glass of merlot
and observe his neighbors unloading strange cargo. The news articles reporting on
terrorism-associated raids in Toulouse did not provide detailed location information, so at
the time of this research, I was unable to determine exactly where in Toulouse these
raids occurred. The events could have occurred in low-income areas because Toulouse
has a high GINI index. The wealthier residents of that department drive up the income
level, but there are also areas that are much less well-off, sometimes in close proximity
to upper income neighborhoods.
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Toulouse contains gated communities that exist side by side with low-income
neighborhoods. Residents on opposite ends of the income spectrum often live in close
proximity, yet are highly segregated. They shop in different stores and do not typically
cross paths. The department is has also grown very rapidly over the past 10 years.
Although job opportunities for business executives have increased, blue collar jobs and
independent contractor opportunities in Toulouse are shrinking.

The social segregation and gating of communities is driven by security concerns on the
part of those living in the upper income areas. Robert Monné, CEO of Monné-Ducroix, a
major developer of gated communities in Toulouse, explains that while people value
security, no city has the resources to provide complete security, gated communities can
bring residents peace of mind. The transition to gated communities follows the American
model. For Americans, this choice is consistent with a nation that is largely capitalist and
unabashedly multi-class. In France, it can seem a bit incongruous and hard to justify for
more socialist-minded populations. As new residents of one of the Toulouse gated
communities explained to a journalist covering the trend, ‘Even if we still vote for the
Communist party and are against the idea of social segregation, we want to live
somewhere quiet’. This is not unusual behavior. Monne adds. “…in fact, most of the
councils where we have located estates are on the left…” (Belmssous, 2002)

Not surprisingly, the positive income coefficient coincides with a positive graduate
education coefficient, since high education often provides the skills that command higher
salaries. Unfortunately, without more specific data on where the raids occurred,

73

interpretation of the coefficients’ impact must be tempered to more general analyses, as
background information on those arrested in connection with the event data points is
difficult to uncover.

VI.

Background of suspected extremists—Do They Fit the Model?

Some of those arrested do have criminal backgrounds. For example, according to
French officials, Muhammed Merah, the French national who in 2012 committed several
terrorism-related killings in Toulouse and Montauban, came from a working class
neighborhood and had a history of petty crime arrests. Merah was associated with the
Forsane Alizza network and trained at terrorist camps in Pakistan and Waziristan. Merah
does not appear to be well-educated or come from a high-income family, though he does
have a petty criminal history that would be consistent with the generally positive crime
rate coefficient.

Another Toulouse-based network was associated with Mohamed Merah, who conducted
terrorist attacks in March 2012 that resulted in seven deaths, four at a Jewish school in
Toulouse. This group conducted attacks in southern France, and some group members
also fought in Syria. (Holman, 2015) Police charged two group members as Merah’s
accomplices. One individual was, according to police statement, "a member of the
traveler community who converted to Islam..." The other group member charged with
assisting Merah was the traveler’s ex-girlfriend. (Phelan, 2012)
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Information about the traveler’s educational background and income level was
unavailable at time of research, but travelers tend to have limited income and education
in France as well as in Bulgaria and Romania, countries from which many of them
emigrate. (Chiriac, 2012) Friction between travelers, also called Roma, and government
authorities has sometimes become violent. In July 2010, French Roma attacked a police
station, destroyed trees and set cars on fire in the Loire Valley in retaliation for the police
shooting of a Roma who knocked down a police officer as he drove through a police
checkpoint in the process. President Sarkozy responded by ordering the dismantling of
approximately 300 illegal camps within three months. He stated that the camps were
“…sources of illegal trafficking, of profoundly shocking living standards, of exploitation of
children for begging, of prostitution and crime". (BBC, 2010) In 2009, authorities
implemented a mass deportation of Romanian and Bulgarian illegal immigrants,
expelling them from camping sites throughout the country. (BBC, 2010)

One of the people arrested in a March 2012 raid does not appear to hold an advanced
degree or to be financially comfortable. Willie Bridgette spent much of his time sharing
boarding with others, some of whom shared his extremist views. He is now serving a
nine-year sentence. Forsane Alizza member Willie Brigette lived in Couronnes, a suburb
in the 11th arrondissement of Paris, converted to Islam and attended mosques and
Islamic schools with reputations for preaching extremist anti-Western messages. He
twice deserted the French navy and held a variety of jobs including butcher, social
worker teacher, and drug rehab counselor. He was twice divorced and had three
children. Police suspect him of obtaining travel documents for Ahmed Shah Massoud’s
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assassins. In 2007, he was convicted of planning to attack an Australian nuclear facility.
(Peterson & Fray, 2004)

Some of the individuals linked to the event data were well-educated and possibly
financially comfortable. Rany Arnaud was arrested in December 2008 for planning to
plant a bomb outside a government building near the Eiffel Tower. Arnaud was educated
in computer electronics and lived in Val-de-Marne, a moderately well-to-do area just
outside of Paris. Rany traveled to Syria and made several attempts to join the
insurgency in Iraq. He eventually joined Algerian radicals. Upon his arrest, he informed
police that he planned multiple attacks on French soil, including the French Intelligence
Service headquarters. Arnaud was arrested with Nadir Badache and Adrien Guihal, two
suspected co-conspirators. I was unable to find information on the backgrounds of
Badache or Guihal.

I could find relevant background information for one of the Paris cases—that of Jeremie
Sidney—though the information was insufficient to provide insight on whether or not the
case conformed to all three model coefficients. In October 2012, Jeremie Sidney and
another man threw a grenade at a kosher supermarket in Sarcelles, a Paris suburb.
Jeremie Sidney was radicalized while in prison for drug trafficking. He joined a jihadist
group and recruited fighters for the insurgency in Syria. (Hinnant, 2012) Jeremie Sydney
did not appear to be well-educated or well-to-do, but his case does conform to the model
in that he has a criminal history.
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VII.

Factors excluded from the regression analysis

Social Environment—Impact of Ethnicity

In order to assess the impact of factors associated with supportive populations and
historically marginalized social environments, it is necessary to identify areas with high
North African and Middle Eastern immigrant populations. Data on ethnic population
percentages were included in the exploratory regression analysis to assess their
correlation with event locations. A high positive correlation would indicate that these
ethnic communities might be more tolerant of extremist ideas than are areas that have
other ethnic compositions or predominantly of multi-generational French heritage.
Extensive searches for GIS and tabular datasets detailing populations of individual
ethnic groups, immigrant nationalities, and religious populations were not fruitful. INSEE
maintains datasets on immigrants vs. non-immigrants and French citizens vs. noncitizens, because France imposes legal restraints on collecting this type of data.

The French government must conform to Article 8, Law number 78-17 (6 January 1978),
a law that prevents the collection of data on ethnicity and religion on the grounds that the
collection of such data is an invasion of privacy. The spirit of the law is traced to
regulations enacted in 1872 that prohibit the government from collecting personal
information on ethnicity and religious affiliation. (Camilleri, 2012) The most specific
datasets I was able to find address ethnicity on the department level, giving population
numbers for first-generation Algerian, Moroccan, Tunisian, and Turkish immigrants in
separate fields. I summed these fields and computed the percentage with respect to the
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total population for that year per department. The result is, hopefully, a reasonably
accurate representation of the proportion of northern African and Turkish immigrants per
department.

I also compiled a table that lists the number of mosques per commune, including the
address and any descriptive notes on the size of the mosque and the theological bent of
its imam(s). For example, if the imam advocated progressive ideas or strict, unyielding
interpretation of Islamic laws. I abandoned this compilation because it became
impossible to determine the theology of many of the mosques. Additionally, it became
clear that an accurate representation of the concentration of mosques would be
daunting, and its accuracy impossible to verify.

Societal Membership—and the Political Voice

Support of the head scarf ban was much stronger among the broader French population
(69%), and may indicate a significant risk factor that is much harder to quantify in a
model—societal membership. Researchers from Sorbonne University and University of
California, San Diego, and Stanford University found that job applicants with an
ethnically Muslim name were 2.5 times less likely to receive calls to interview for a
position than were candidates with comparable CVs but non-ethnically Muslim names.
Researchers controlled for regional differences, employment sector, company size,
occupation, contract type, and whether or not the CV included a photograph.
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If societal membership is an inverse risk factor, then how might we quantify it for a
model? One metric might be Muslim representation in local politics. The table compiled
for this research records the proportion of council members of possible North African or
Middle Eastern ethnicity in the commune they represent. Representation is difficult to
quantify, as representatives are not required to identify themselves as Muslim.
Therefore, the numbers are determined based on the council member’s name.

The relationship between the percentage of local council representatives of North
African or Middle Eastern ethnicity and the number of arrests/raids in those areas
between 2008 and 2012 is expressed in an R2 value of .0295. The graph below shows
the relationship between events and ethnic representation on the municipal level. There
appears to be no linear relationship, but the graph will be regenerated after the datasets
are verified for accuracy.

Figure 15. Number of Events and Percentage Middle-Eastern and North African Municipal
Representation in 2008.
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Outlier Communes

Aubervilliers is an outlier in the data, in that the commune has the highest ethnic
representation of any of the communes in the dataset, yet there was one event within its
boundaries. However, removing it from the dataset did not have much impact on the
correlation. Recalculation after removing the outlier still returns a weak correlation. Thus,
based on these metrics, there is a very weak correlation between social representation,
at least in the political arena, and the presence of safe-houses.

Proximity to Sensitive Urban Zones

While not all 752 sensitive urban zones had arrests/raid events, most recorded events
occurred in or within a mile of communes with sensitive urban zones. 24 Initial research
identified 512 communes containing at least one ZUS. 25

24

The average area of a commune is approximately 5 square miles.

25

Number is approximate due to differing definitions of what area is a commune.
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Figure 16. Map Showing ZUS Regions and Event Locations.

A ZUS is an official designation for what French authorities deem an “at risk” area.
According to INSEE, France’s National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies,
Sensitive Urban Zones are “Les zones urbaines sensibles (ZUS) sont des territoires
infra-urbains définis par les pouvoirs publics pour être la cible prioritaire de la politique
de la ville, en fonction des considérations locales liées aux difficulties que connaissent
les habitants de ces territoires.” “Sensitive Urban Zones (ZUS) are sub-urban areas
defined by the government to be the primary target of the policy of the city, according to
local analyses of the problems known to inhabitants of these territories.” ZUS are
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characterized by high unemployment and low high school graduation rates. There are
752 ZUSs in France, 718 of which are on the mainland in metropolitan France. There
are 36,552 communes in metropolitan France, and 490 of these communes contain at
least one ZUS. (Leonard, 2015) (Henry & Dieusaert, 2014)

In 1996, the French government created the Sensitive Urban Zones as part of their
Urban Regeneration Pact.

The Pact sought to bring public services to urban

communities, ensure the security of residents, stimulate the local economy to increase
employment opportunities, and promote social diversity. The government established an
Economic Revitalization Fund to financially support this program. It initially designated
700 ZUS and added other zone types—350 Urban Regeneration Zones (ZRU) and 38
Urban Free Zones (ZFU).

The Urban Regeneration Pact increased police presence, and special educational
facilities were established to accommodate juvenile repeat offenders.

In 2003, the French government augmented ZUS funding when it established an Urban
Renewal Programme for ZUS. This program had a five-year, €30 billion budget
earmarked for the most blighted neighborhoods, and would be applied to physical
improvements and attracting businesses to the areas. The program lures businesses to
these areas with special incentives, such as waiving social security contribution
requirements. A portion of the budget goes to special skills training for residents in need
of education to make them more employable. (Government of France, 2007)
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Communes that contain at least one ZUS:

10 of the 50 events could not be identified at the commune level. For the 38 events that
were pinpointed to a commune, 36 of those occurred in communes that contained at
least one ZUS or were themselves a ZUS. The actual percentage may be as high as
94%, given that 9 of the arrests/raid locations could not be located with more specificity
than the general locale of Paris, and one (a multi-arrest/raid in Herault) could not be
identified at the commune level. If this is the case, then the presence of a sensitive
urban zone is a strong predictor of safe-house location. 26

The correlation between the number of proximate ZUS and event locations increased
when ethnic population was incorporated into the linear regression analysis. Linear
regression conducted on ZUS against arrests/raids showed a Pearson’s correlation of
.777.

If the number of proximate ZUS was considered with the percentage population of ethnic
origin (Algerians, Moroccans, Tunisians, Turks) per department, the Pearson correlation
index increased to .8, indicating a high degree of correlation between these variables
and the number of arrests/raids. Therefore, preliminary analysis indicates that ethnic
composition does not significantly increase correlation, but the proximity to a ZUS is a
key indicator of an area’s risk.

26

The news articles that report of arrests/raids in Paris do not specify the arrondissement in
which the arrest/raid events occurred. To include the events and analyze commune-level data,
Paris is treated as a single commune for the purposes of this analysis.
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ZUS Components

Given that the presence of ZUS is correlated so highly with arrest/raid locations, the
question logically follows, “what is it about a ZUS that makes it correlate so highly with
the occurrence of arrest/raids?” Since the French government uses high unemployment,
high crime, and low educational attainment as the main criteria determining designation,
it makes sense to begin by examining these phenomena individually for any correlation
with arrests/raid events.

Unemployment

According to Exploratory OLS and GWR applied to the France test case, unemployment
is a very weak predictor of events, scoring at 3.12% significance in the exploratory
model, just above the weakest predictor tested, the percentage of residents between 15
and 64 years of age with no education beyond primary school.

This assessment

appears to counter a body of social science analysis that argues otherwise. An IRIN
News analysis cites unemployment as one of three significant radicalization factors in
Kenya: “Unemployment, poverty and political marginalization are contributing to the
Islamic radicalization of Kenya's youth, …” (Integrated Regional Information Networks,
2013) There are a number of potential explanations for its lack of predictive power in this
model. High unemployment might be an influential factor in Kenya, but not in European
countries, or it might only be impactful only if accompanied by other risk factors.
Aggravating factors might be a high unemployment rate combined with high youth
percentage in population. High GINI index might be another. The regression analysis
conducted in this research, however, does not indicate that either factor combined with
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unemployment constitutes a combination that encourages radicalization or an
environment vulnerable to the establishment of extremist safe-houses—at least in the
case of France.

Secondly, the unemployment variable might only exert an impact if the unemployment
rate is very high. The point at which unemployment becomes an aggravating factor is a
separate empirical research topic in itself.

Figure 17. Average Unemployment by Department, 2008 INSEE data.
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Low Educational Level

The correlation between radicalization and limited education has largely been dispelled
by recent research. The assumption that low education is linked to radicalization persists
in professional circles, despite over 30 years of counter-evidence. Russell and Miller
conducted research in 1977 to develop a sociological profile for terrorists. Based on
statistics for over 350 terrorists in America, Europe, Asia, and the Middle East, they built
a composite profile of a typical terrorist as a single male in his early to mid-20’s with a
university education. Interestingly, most of the terrorists in the study were recruited
while pursuing their university education. A notable difference between Russell and
Miller’s discoveries and that of more recent research is that the majority of extremists in
the 1977 study had academic backgrounds in the humanities, law, and medicine,
whereas a study conducted in 2009 indicates a majority pursued careers in physical
sciences, such as engineering. Russell and Miller detected this shift and recommended
further research to refine the profile to reflect “…increased involvement by technically
trained individuals,…” (Russell & Miller, 1977) Gambetta and Hertog’s 2005 study found
that university graduates with physical science backgrounds were “…strongly
overrepresented…” in Islamic extremist groups. Gambetta and Hertog compiled
educational data from 404 perpetrators of politically-motivated violent acts in 30
countries between 2005 and 2007. Of the 178 perpetrators whose academic
backgrounds could be determined, 44% had majored in engineering. Further, no other
academic specialization followed closely behind the engineer majority. The secondlargest group consisted of Islamic Studies majors, who comprised 19% of the sample
set. Gambetta and Hertog do not offer an explanation for this high proportionate
representation beyond their observation that engineers tend to hold more conservative
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views. Even if this observation is accurate, it does not adequately explain the tendency
toward radicalization, as extremism can be interpreted as either highly conservative or
highly rebellious behavior, depending on context or perspective. However, during an
interview by IEEE Spectrum magazine, Hertog observed that “Engineering seems to
attract a larger share of people drawn to rule-bound systems, compared with other
scientists who primarily work on open-ended questions and might be more skeptical.”
(Hertog, 2008) In fact, empirical research indicates the opposite might be true. As
Berrebi concludes from his study, “If anything, the correlation I find is that those with
higher education and higher living standards are more likely to participate in terrorist
activity.” (Berrebi, 2007) As explained earlier, Hassan’s (2001) study of 250 Palestinian
extremists revealed that none were uneducated.

The variable expressing limited or absence of formal education was included to
investigate whether or not France exhibits outlier behavior. In short, it comports with the
contemporary analysis in that events occurred in locations and involved individuals with
limited as well as high education.

Exploratory regression analysis that included this variable found the low education
coefficient statistically significant for only 27% of the datapoints. Its influence was evenly
split, with 55.21% of the arrondissements exhibiting a positive correlation between
limited education and events, and 44.79% of the arrondissements showing a negative
correlation.
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Figure 18. Population Percentage Aged 18-64 with No Education Beyond High School by
Department, 2008 INSEE data.

State Policy

For the purposes of this research, state policy was an initial candidate variable because
states can implement policies that affect a location’s suitability for harboring violent
extremists, either intentionally or unintentionally.

For example, they may do so

intentionally through the use terrorist entities as foreign policy tools, perhaps providing
training and boarding locations to the groups that advance the host state’s interest.
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States can also be unintentional sponsors if they are controlled by a weak central
government, or if they tolerate—or cannot control—government corruption at the local
level and radicalized elements take advantage of that vulnerability.

Some states—Syria and Iran, for example—have been accused of using terrorist groups
to achieve foreign policy ends.

Before the 2011 conflict in Syria, members of the

international community asserted that Syria sought to further its interests in Lebanon by
directly supporting Hamas and by working with Hizballah. Hizballah, in turn, has been
linked to Iran, with whom it shares a friendly relationship and religious ideology. Such
ties could extend to offering those groups safe harbor and training. Such was the case of
Pakistan’s early assistance to the Taliban, which is now threatening its stability both
directly and by complicating many of its diplomatic initiatives. Intentional state sponsors
are safe-houses on the macro-level, and groups that have the support of governments
can strike far beyond neighboring states and be truly global, with considerable resources
from which to draw.

Unintentionally hospitable state policy can have significant impact as a variable
coefficient simply because terrorists are more likely to establish bases in regions within
which it is easiest to operate. This phenomenon accounts for much of the resiliency of
terrorism. It expresses on a macro-level what law enforcement faces on a micro-level
whenever they attempt to eliminate drug-dealing and prostitution from an afflicted
neighborhood—the crime is not eliminated, as offenders simply move to a more
hospitable region and continue their activities.
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State Policy—Identity Conflict Dynamic

This political environment can exist in countries containing multicultural regions that are
often near a border, where residents may identify with the neighboring state rather than
the state in which they reside, thus compromising the allegiance of local officials who are
often residents of that enclave, as well. The importance of social identity over national
identity can diminish the respect of legal boundaries, rendering certain illegal activities
socially and morally acceptable. Some Muslim enclaves in France emphasize their
social identity over that of their French citizenship. Radicalized French natives identify
with those social groups whose extremist doctrine they adopt.

Thus, they not only

identify with that social group, but with the larger culture or nation from which it
originated.

In some instances, social identity not only isolates the group from the larger community,
but also shapes its attitude toward the government. Local residents do not view the host
country as their supporter or protector, and they often view the state as “other”, rather
than as a macro-expression of their local society. This attitude can be found in many
Muslim communities in France. These residents do not identify with native French
citizens and by extension, the French government. They believe they are viewed as
outsiders, and that the government holds the interests of the native French over their
own. Their perception is reinforced by domestic policies that restrict Muslims, but have
no similar effect on other groups. Thus, their attitude of “otherness” toward the state
moves beyond characterization as merely foreign and becomes adversarial.
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The central government’s influence is further weakened if the region is also
geographically remote. This is often the case in regions of Afghanistan, Pakistan, and in
Syria before its current internal conflict. This dynamic does not apply to France, but it is
an important variable to consider when applying the model to other cases.

A state’s political environment shapes many other variables, generating domestic and
foreign policies that affect its cultural environments and its physical security (e.g.,
enabling or inhibiting smuggling routes). For example, France’s refusal to participate in
the overthrow of Saddam Hussein and its active support of Palestinian statehood
demonstrate that it is not generally hostile to Muslim views, or even to some positions
championed by religious extremists.
crushes all dissent.

Neither is it an autocratic state that violently

However, French perspectives on identity create difficulties in

reconciling one’s identity as French for those whose cultural and religious identities
originate from a region beyond French borders. Ascertaining the relative importance of
these two factors—the weighting of variables in multi-modal modeling systems—is
critical to the determination of a tipping point with respect to influence of identity on a
location’s vulnerability to hosting extremist safehavens. Successful factor weighting can
also determine whether or not changes in public policy or foreign policy can sufficiently
alter the weighting and improve the security situation.

State Policy—The Headscarf Ban

State policy could be a contributing factor because some policies impact daily life and
can even send an official message about what the state values in terms of the social
identity of its residents. France’s 2005 prohibition of head scarves in public schools is
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one such example. The ban implemented Laïcité—the French policy of secularism. The
government argued that wearing a headscarf in school amounted to displaying a
religious symbol in a public setting. Most French citizens supported the headscarf ban,
and Muslims might interpret this widespread support of an official prohibition of a
religious practice as a rejection of their religious identity. The message in effect being,
“you aren’t part of the larger ‘we’, and we don’t want to see you in our public spaces”.
However, Laïcité as a state policy might not be a risk factor. More likely, the actual risk
factor is the popular attitude that supports the policy. In 2004, Comprendre Pour Mieux
Décider (CSA) conducted a survey to gauge the level of support for the ban before it
was implemented and found that 49% of Muslim women supported the ban. A significant
proportion (43%) opposed it, but this split suggests that if the headscarf ban was
intended as a societal message, it was not a clear one. (Evry, 2004)

Supportive Population

A supportive population is necessary for the group’s sustained functioning as a macrosafe-house. The ethnic population also provides some of the group’s funding and is
usually the primary recruitment base. Thus, the group’s ability to identify with the ethnic
population is a prerequisite for its continued operation. Successful identification does
not rest solely on shared culture. Agreement with terrorists’ grievances must be shared
by the ethnic community, and that community must believe that terrorist group advances
their shared interests.
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The expression of this contributing factor becomes more complicated with the existence
of multiple groups whose interests overlap and who both claim the same cultural identity.
Although it is possible for more than one terrorist group to enjoy the support of an ethnic
community, resources are a valuable benefit of securing popular support. Money and
recruits are finite resources, and competition between terrorist groups often occurs. The
groups compete for the community’s devotion by engaging in activities designed to
demonstrate their dedication to the shared cause and their value to the community.
Dedication is sometimes demonstrated through launching operations designed to draw
attention on the world stage. However, such endeavors require some care, as it is
possible to overstep the bounds of what is acceptable to the population. Value to the
community is expressed by providing services that the population appreciates. Hamas
and Hizballah have conducted many terrorist acts, but also expend resources within their
ethnic communities to provide social services in order to demonstrate their value as
community benefactors (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2008).

Religiosity Coefficients

This research seeks insight into the locations that radicalized individuals consider
suitable to establish residence, recruit, store supplies, and plan attacks. The individuals
associated with the test data claimed religious motivation based on radical
misinterpretation of Islamic teachings. While variables quantifying supportive populations
(detailed in the previous section, “Supportive Population”) sometimes touch on religion,
another variable was designed to quantify radicalized religiosity. This “radical religiosity”
variable—RR coefficient was designed as a compound variable that incorporated the
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concentration of mosques with the mosques’ interpretations of Islam. The process
involved researching religious leaders who espoused intolerant, extremist, and finally,
explicitly violent interpretations of Islamic concepts. Once identified, further research was
conducted to identify the mosques they led and where they were welcomed as guest
clerics. Another variable for “inclusive religiosity”—IR coefficient—was developed for
locations with mosques led by clerics who espoused an unusually inclusive interpretation
of Islam. For example, Mohammed Ludovic Lütfi Zahed encourages tolerance of
homosexuality, a behavior that is generally rejected by Muslims. (Würger, 2014) The IR
variable could be negative or positive coefficient. It might lessen the attractiveness of a
site if a radicalized individual perceived the area as an unlikely area for successful
recruiting, or as an area where the risk of being exposed to counter-terrorism authorities
was high. Conversely, it might function as a positive coefficient if the Imam were in the
minority, and the surrounding population was deeply offended by the unusually liberal
interpretation of Islam.

To build the shape file for this variable, a dataset consisting of the names of Mosques,
their geographic coordinates, addresses, and associated leaders was developed from
extensive internet research of newspaper articles, blogs, interviews, and academic
papers that addressed Islamic practices in France. The variables were judged
inapplicable to France for several reasons.

Firstly, quantifying the mosques was

daunting based on sheer volume. As of 2009, there were over 2,000 mosques in
mainland France. (Marcel, 2009) It is difficult to obtain an exact number, largely because
the fundamental question of what constitutes a mosque is difficult to answer. This
question could not be answered satisfactorily given the data available, even when a
clear definition is established. While conducting research for each mosque included in
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the dataset, it was discovered that some entities listed as mosques were little more than
small prayer rooms. The question arises, “isn’t that a mosque, as well?” One could
define a mosque as a place of prayer guided by an individual acknowledged in religious
circles as qualified to lead prayers.

If so, then many of these prayer rooms are

mosques. The legitimacy of these sites as mosques could not be established if the
identities and credentials of their imams were not explicitly available, and this was often
the case. Even many of the larger mosques did not list the identities of their religious
directors. Additionally, even if this data were available, its inclusion might introduce a
temporal component in the analysis. The imam’s tenure at the mosque would have to be
temporally established and bracketed as a variable, and the residency period of the
sample set subjects would have to be established and incorporated, as well. Temporal
analysis would be a welcome addition if the sample size were large enough to
incorporate temporal analysis into the regression model. Since there were only 49
events from 2008-2012, enlarging the sample would require either expanding the time
window, or engaging French counter-terrorism and law enforcement authorities to
enhance the sample set granularity.

Existing Smuggling Routes

Transportation routes for the support of terrorist activities are often established along
pre-existing routes used for other illegal activities, such as drug-smuggling, and terrorist
operations are frequently funded through illicit trade. For instance, France is a major
transit and distribution point for Moroccan cannabis, thus there is a pre-established
network for transportation related to terrorist activity. (Caron, 2015) (Boekhout van
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Solinge, 1995) Therefore, it is not surprising that convicted terrorist Menad Benchellali
had a brother Hafed who was convicted of a financial crime—payroll theft.

Their

father’s connection with the Algerian Armed Islamic Group (GIA) has provided a much
needed avenue through which to obtain financing. The group used its ties to extremist
enclaves in France (and elsewhere in Europe) to engage in drug and weapons
trafficking. Thus, not only does existing illicit trade increase the probability of the
development of terrorist safe-houses, but the presence of these locations increases the
local crime rate, as the town of Roubaix experienced when its residents fell victim to
several armed robberies.

A 2005 report by Shelley, et al. (2005) entitled Methods and Motives: Exploring Links
Between Transnational Organized Crime & International Terrorism, studied links
between criminal networks and terrorist groups and identified 12 situations, or watch
points, in which this interaction was likely to occur.

Such instances result in the

enhancement of both criminal and terrorist entities. The coincidental needs of both
sectors (i.e., safe-houses, smuggling routes, untraceable funds) highlight similarities
between the two groups, thus some contributing factors are held in common. These
factors closely resemble the watch points described in the report.

Although the research of Shelley et al. primarily focused on criminal organizations, the
ability of these groups to enhance terrorist operations warrants that the significance of
social environment to criminal networks be briefly addressed. Criminal networks often
identify with their parent culture and use this affinity to deeply entrench themselves
within their ethnic neighborhoods, and they do so on several levels. Firstly, they apply
their intimate knowledge of the social mores, customs, and language of the culture to
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garner sympathy from their community.

Secondly, they capitalize on the insular

behavior of an ethnic community that is disenfranchised from the mainstream population.
The community either supports them as “one of their own”, or fails to report their crimes
out of mistrust of authorities and a lack of confidence in its ability to protect them in what
is, in some ways, a state within a state.

Border Proximity

Geographical proximity to inter-state borders and transportation routes increases the
vulnerability of the locale. These locations allow actors to establish stable bases without
sacrificing the mobility required to commit inter-state acts or seek refuge if threatened by
local authorities. Proximity to borders and transport routes (both inter-state and local)
facilitates the movement of illicit goods, such as weapons or drugs.

Venissieux, France is an example of a city offering a supportive environment near a
state border, providing easy access to major highways and less than two hours from
Switzerland. Local residents of this Lyon suburb identified more closely with radicalized
individuals in their midst and actively supported them by falsely reporting their passports
as “lost” so that a local extremist cell could use them for interstate travel. Venissieux
residents Mourad and Nizar Sassi used the documents to enter Afghanistan to attend an
Al-Q’aeda training camp, where they were captured while combating U.S. forces.
(Associated Press, 2004)
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Roubaix is another example of a French locale with a supportive population that is
proximate to an interstate border. It is just over an hour from Brussels. In 2005, Roubaix
resident Lionel Dumont was sentenced to 30 years in prison for his role leading an
Islamic extremist cell that financed jihadist attacks via armed robberies. (Mili, 2006)

Border proximity was not included in the exploratory regression analysis because
France’s extensive road network, easy access to airports and sea ports render interstate travel convenient for virtually every French locale. It is however, worthy of note that
14 of the 50, or almost a third of the events in the dataset are positioned within eight
miles of an inter-state border or sea coast. This might seem like an unimpressive
proportion, but it implies that geographic proximity to a border could have impact in other
case studies.

Micro-level Variables

One of the most frustrating aspects of using quantitative analytic techniques is that the
analysis is often limited by the availability and format of the data required for the
analysis. Micro-level variables were omitted from the exploratory regression analysis
because the data granularity simply was not available in this research context. While the
demographic and municipal data exist at the required granularity, the test data are not
openly available to this level of specificity. Thus, while the GIS files can be constructed—
no easy feat, but not impossible—the test data could rarely be resolved to the specific
address. Since there are only 50 datapoints in the test dataset, nearly all of them would
have to have building level location data as a prerequisite to including micro-level
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variables in the model. Greater refinement of the test data could result in a more
nuanced model that incorporates these variables.

While the previously described factors can influence neighborhoods at more local
scales, additional factors can manifest on the micro-scale that impact the selection of the
base or safe-house itself, once a local neighborhood is identified.

Desirable structures exhibit several characteristics.

The ideal site is surrounded by

space sufficient for maneuverability while hidden from view. For instance, the presence
of buildings with high surrounding walls, trees or other objects that obstruct aerial view,
enable the transport of contraband and operatives while unseen. This area provides a
protected space for the alteration of vehicles for purposes such as obscuring the
vehicle’s identity from law enforcement or the installation of weapons.

Extensions of the geographical aspect of this factor include the presence of hidden
driveways. Angles or structures that enable one-way surveillance, such that the group
can be aware of others approaching without themselves being seen are also desirable
characteristics of safe-houses. Therefore, buildings that exhibit these features should be
viewed with suspicion as buildings likely to serve as safe-houses.

Access routes are another important consideration and their viability depends on
geographical and social factors. Proximity to routes that lead to borders facilitate either
cross-border attacks to neighboring states hostile to terrorists or an escape to states out
of reach from local law enforcement. Major thoroughfares that lead to mass modes of
transportation, such as airports and train stations, enable increased mobility, sometimes
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with the possibility of anonymity, as some forms of mass transit, such as busses, trains,
and busy streets, allow individuals to evade law enforcement and become “lost in the
crowd”.

Social factors that contribute to the desirability of access routes include supportive local
populations, populations of diverse ethnicity, and high-crime areas. The importance of
supportive populations is described in the section specifically addressing this factor, but
it is important to note that although a supportive population exerts an influence at both
macro- and micro-levels, its impact is usually felt most acutely at the micro-level. The
effectiveness of a supportive population stems from its “grass roots” power.

If the

neighborhood sympathizes with the terrorist group or is at minimum, hostile to
government officials, they will be aware of the movements of the individuals, but allow
them to continue operating by refusing to provide information leading to the group’s
apprehension. In extreme cases, such support effectively extends the safe operating
space if the terrorists can be seen on the streets with little or no security risk to
themselves.

As is often the case for research involving the social sciences, efforts to establish
precise and discrete objects of study prove challenging.

More importantly, when

achieved, such divisions distort results, as they omit qualities that can only be observed
if the social mechanisms are viewed holistically. The interdependence among many, if
not all, of the contributing factors is readily apparent.
separately identifiable elements is also clear.

Yet, their ability to vary as

The ability to perceive the subtle

relationships and the changes that their variations exert on the whole is critical to
producing a meaningful model with practical applications.
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VIII.

Conclusion

This dissertation research demonstrates that if spatial components are omitted, the
independent variables have a weak to insignificant correlation with the presence of safehouses and often, multicollinearity is present when multiple variables are considered in
combination. However, the incorporation of geographic weighting reveals linkages
between

independent

variables

and

the

presence

of

safe-houses

because

geographically weighted regression integrates spatial characteristics that affect social
phenomena. A cornerstone of GIS theory is Tobler’s First Law of Geography which
states that, “everything is related to everything else, but near things are more related
than distant things”. Geographic regression analysis incorporates the social reality that
those of similar social characteristics tend to cluster together, and as the distance
increases from a point of comparison, those similarities tend to diminish. An analytic
technique that can account for this phenomenon has greater analytical power than a
technique that only graphs quantifiable relationships when applied to social topics.

The factors presented for this model are widely recognized by specialists in security
studies as playing an influential role in terrorist activity.

Though this research has

provided insight concerning these factors, debate on their relative importance, degree of
interaction and interdependence is expected to continue, as it should, especially
considering the data challenges associated with this case study. Future efforts building
upon this research can refine the model design and apply it to more extensive datasets
to provide a deeper understanding of these issues, and this information can be useful to
counteract radicalization and identify potential locations for safehavens.
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Furthermore, the model’s GIS environment facilitates comprehension of the results by
providing a visual depiction of the output, potentially presenting the user with multiple
levels of analysis within a single graphic. Thus, it can convey results in a manner
unmatched by a strictly textual format. This feature is particularly useful when conveying
analysis to those lacking a background in quantitative analysis.

This prototype model can serve as the foundation to develop a model that not only
informs security specialists on a practical level, but also offers theoretical and policyfocused benefits. Geographically weighted regression is flexible and scalable in that it
can incorporate multiple variables and process large datasets, producing a customized
design for the region to which it is applied.

With the integration of additional relevant datasets of sufficient granularity, the model
could provide indicators of at-risk areas. If test data with high demographic granularity is
included, micro-level variables excluded from this prototype (described in chapter ”Microlevel Variables”) could be evaluated to characterize their impact. For example, specific
addresses of those arrested and of raid locations could test neighborhood and building
characteristics with the inclusion of datasets with similar specificity. INSEE stores this
type of data. 27 Government agencies and non-profit organizations often have specialized
databases that could be incorporated in the model to evaluate other variables.

27

An example of this type of high granularity dataset is base-ic-logement-2011.xls. This file
contains the number of rooms and type of residence, how many reserved parking spaces, type of
heating, the year it was built, how long residences were occupied before the residents moved,
and other variables, all on the arrondissement level.
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Refinements to this model can assist policy-makers and social scientists, providing
insights into whether state policy on the local level is more influential than at the national
level, or whether those policies can provide an effective counterbalance to other factors,
such as immigration waves, demand fluctuation of employment skillsets, and under what
conditions those policies would have the most impact.

For example, in 2008, France’s Ministry for Higher Education and Research launched
Operation Campus to improve France’s international standing in the higher education
and scientific research arenas. The plan allocated €5 billion to selected universities,
enabling the establishment of 10 “super-campuses” for higher education and research.
University recipients were chosen on the basis of “…their pedagogical and scientific
ambition, building renovation needs, proposals for improving student life and the extent
to which their region would benefit from their ‘structural and innovative character’”.
(Marshall, 2008) A portion of the funding established “super-campuses” in Lyon and
Toulouse, areas that showed positive correlation of higher education with terrorismassociated raids or arrests in the prototype model. 28 Higher education showed no
significant correlation in Strasbourg, also a super-campus recipient. If a refined version
of the model with higher data granularity showed similar results, the funding might be
more effectively allocated to a region where higher education was a negativelycorrelated coefficient.

28

To prevent misinterpretation of this paragraph, I re-iterate that the model developed in this
research is a prototype. This paragraph does not imply that 1) there is a definite correlation
between higher education and the existence of a location that hosts extremists, or 2) that French
policy-makers should have made different policy decisions. First, the model-due to limitations
mentioned in the body of this text-does not include datasets of sufficient granularity and scope to
assess with strong confidence that the three coefficients identified in the model are in fact, the
three most significant variables, nor that the nature of their correlation-negative or positive-is
reflective of reality.
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The geographically-weighted regression included in ESRI software is based on ordinary
least squares statistical method. As the research developed, datasets that would be the
basis for coefficients grew very large, especially in relation to the test data (events). The
problem of the small sample set was compounded by granularity issues that became
more pronounced as the research progressed. These problems were highlighted through
extensive testing using different types of regression models (including logistical
regression), While GWR provided insight into the research question, its use of ordinary
least squares to generate the weights proved to be a less than ideal fit.

However, other regression techniques can be applied in future research to yield more
accurate results if these techniques can be integrated with geographic weighting. For
example, the application of regularized regression techniques would address problems
associated with overfitting, a vulnerability associated with this dissertation research,
given the volume and complexity of the independent variable set relative to the sample
size.

Lasso regularization constrains the residual sum of squares to the parameter vectors’ L1
norm to a maximum value. The L1 norm minimizes the sum of the absolute differences
between the observed and estimated values.

Robert Tibshirani developed this

regularization technique and uses a Newton-Raphson algorithm to perform an iterative
reweighting least squares loop to determine the maximum value. (Tibshirani, 1996)

The Newton-Raphson algorithm employs a function based on the maximum value from a
Taylor series approximation. The Taylor series approximates the function that is the
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closest fit to the test data’s behavior against a set of parameters. The resulting maximum
constant is used to specify the algorithm for first-order optimization.

For the Lasso algorithm, if x is the independent variable and y is the dependent variable,
the lasso estimate (𝛼𝛼’, 𝛽𝛽’) is
2

= arg min �∑𝑁𝑁
𝑖𝑖=1�𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 − 𝛼𝛼 − ∑𝑗𝑗 𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 � �

subject to ∑𝑗𝑗 |𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗 | ≤ 𝑡𝑡. 29

where β is the parameter coefficient. The sum of the absolute values of the parameter
coefficient are constrained by the tuning parameter t—known as the penalty. When t = 0,

parameter coefficient β is the linear regression estimate, and as t increases, it shrinks
the parameter coefficient. Lasso regularization sets to zero the parameters that do not

impact the dependent variable Thus, lasso regularization performs variable selection as
it “throws out” irrelevant variables.

Wheeler (2009) tested the effectiveness of the Least Absolute Shrinkage and Selection
Operator (LASSO) applied to geographically weighted regression to manage
multicollinearity in coefficients against non-regularized GWR and ridge-regularized
GWR. He detected multicollinearity in median income and housing rates when applying
non-regularized GWR to a Columbus, Ohio crime dataset. Wheeler found that the GWR
model with localized LASSO outperformed GWR when applied to the crime dataset.
However, he also found that the localized LASSO overshrinks regression coefficients

29

(Tibshirani, 1996)
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and therefore, recommends it only be used to predict the response variable. In this
research context, LASSO would be applied to the regression coefficients, necessitating
the application of global, rather than local LASSO. However, while globalized LASSO
was shown to be more accurate, it is not a viable method for large datasets, as
computational demands could exceed computer memory capacity. This dissertation
research involved a library of large datasets, and thus would not have been viable had
global LASSO been utilized.

Elastic net regularization was developed by Zou and Hastie (2005) to address limitations
of the Lasso regularization technique. Lasso saturates when accommodating a high
number of predictor variables. It also eliminates multicollinearity by eliminating all but
one of the collinear variables. Zou and Hastie demonstrate the effectiveness of their
method using a genetic research case study, where the sample size is small (less than
100) with respect to the variable array (thousands of genes). Gene correlations are often
present, as many share the same biological pathway. Elastic net will select variable
clusters if one variable in that cluster is deemed relevant. The research data in this
dissertation included many variables that would behave as clusters. For instance, crime
statistics were available for burglaries, car thefts, and robberies. These crime statistics
increased and decreased together over time and space. Lasso would eliminate all but
one of the variables, and OLS would require the researcher to omit two of the three
variables to eliminate the multicollinearity. This requirement implies that the inclusion of
all three variables would contribute nothing to the model, but this might not be the case.
It’s possible that nuances in behavior could be lost. Elastic net regularization allows the
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incorporation of collinear variables, grouping the coefficients into an elastic net
framework.

Elastic net is a hybridization of L1 and L2 norms. Whereas for ordinary least squares,
the regularization parameter alpha is zero and for Lasso alpha is equal to one, alpha
values for elastic net lie between zero and one. This regularization technique could be
the preferred alternative if ordinary least squares is too rigid and lasso is judged as too
relaxed for the problem set.

Related research has generally been focused on identifying risks so that potential
targets can be protected. It is hoped that this model will improve security through
prevention, not only by providing insights into drivers and mitigating factors to better
identify solutions, but also by helping to identify which questions should be asked to
implement a solution more effectively.

For instance, the model developed in this research can direct stakeholders’ attention to
areas that might require changes in policy implementation, resource allocation—and
depending on the behavior and level of coefficient impact—provide insight into what
changes might be most effective to minimize an area’s vulnerability to security threats
associated with radicalization. For example, if municipal representation manifests as a
negatively correlated coefficient in some regions but shows little correlation in others,
resources aimed at encouraging group members to enter politics could be concentrated
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in those regions most affected by that coefficient. Moreover, this targeted approach can
be fiscally prudent because resources would not be expended where they are unlikely to
yield significant dividends.

Furthermore, this model can reveal key questions that might otherwise not be asked. For
example, starkly contrasting coefficient behavior in different regions might reveal an
unusual dynamic, and variables can have mutual effects that vary as conditions change.
These contrasting behaviors are evident in the model results, but often this type of
dynamic is active for years and goes unnoticed or is only vaguely apparent outside the
context of the model. There are many possible explanations for contrasting coefficient
behavior. One possibility could be the impact of additional variables that are present in
some of the regions, yet are absent or play a muted role in other areas.

Another possibility might rest with the driver sustaining the variable. For instance,
consider the hypothetical case of country whose high-income coefficients exact
contrasting effects in different districts. One of the high-income districts might owe its
financial health to a resident population that resides outside the country, but these
seasonal residents purchase property because they spend much of their time in the
district and have the wealth to do so. These part-time residents affect the demographic,
but they might have little effect on local industries, commerce, and have limited
interaction with natives. The impact of these high-income residents could be quite
different from that of residents of another district who gained their wealth through local
entrepreneurial endeavors or through professional training. This group might raise their
children in the area, and might perhaps identify more closely with and have a deeper
commitment to the area in which they reside. The model output of this particular case
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might reveal that an emotional stake in the area, or the attitude of permanency that often
accompanies those who “lay down stakes” to raise families, reveals itself as an
unusually strong variable that is the true coefficient—not high-income. Thus, in this
example, the model enabled analysis that cast aside a less relevant question, “what is
the effect of high-income on a district’s vulnerability to harboring a safe-house in country
X?”, and shed light on the question that should actually be asked, which is “how can we
deepen commitment to a space and associate that commitment with identity?” I offer this
exposition as a hypothetical example to illustrate how the model can facilitate the
development of questions that might be more effective catalysts for identifying solutions
for at-risk areas. Finally, this research has laid the foundation for future refinements and
applications of this approach. Thus, it is hoped that going forward this work will deepen
our understanding of multivariate interdependencies and how these differ among
countries in the course of further refinements and applications of this model. This
research should, on a practical level, focus attention on vulnerable areas before that
area becomes destabilized, and serve as a guide to facilitate resource allocation that
enhances quality-of-life for communities.
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Note on Map classification of variables and GWR coefficients.

With the exception of maps displaying Local R2 values, classes are divided using the
Natural Jenks Optimization Method. This classification technique was developed by
George Frederick Jenks and is often used to display data on maps. This method finds
natural breaks in the data by comparing the sum of the squared means deviations to
define the classes such that the average deviation from the class mean is minimized, but
the deviation between the classes is maximized. (Brunsdon, Fotheringham, & Charlton,
1998)

This does not constitute an official release of United States Government (USG)
information. All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed are those of
the author and do not reflect the official positions or views of the USG. Nothing in
the contents should be construed as asserting or implying U.S. Government
authentication of information or endorsement of the author’s views. This material
has been reviewed for classification and compliance with legal obligations.
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